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A COMMON LAW OF ZONING
Michael Allan Wolf*

This Article for the first time identifies a common law of zoning, describes the
typology of this essential and overlooked element of American land use law, and
establishes the historical and structural context for its pervasive set of rules and
principles. Over the past 100 years, American judges, filling in the gaps and
resolving the ambiguities of a surprisingly uniform set of state enabling statutes,
have produced this body of common law. The story will take the reader to Iowa
cornfields that surround an iconic baseball diamond; to a federal agency that gave
an important impetus to the nationwide adoption of this Progressive Era tool at the
state and local levels; to early railroad litigation in Massachusetts yielding a
workable definition of the common law that was popularized by a legendary set of
law school teaching materials; to the provisions of, and cases interpreting, other
model legislation; and to the pages of dozens of state court reports from every region
of the country. Critics have long raised their voices about the evils of height, area,
and use controls; and commentators have directed their attention predominantly to
the constitutional and environmental aspects of land use law. In the meantime, state
courts, left to their own devices, have continued to frame, adapt, and reshape the
common law of zoning.
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INTRODUCTION
Looking back over a century of experience, we can perceive that American
state court judges, assisted and inspired by experts in academia and in practice, have
shaped a fairly consistent body of law that seamlessly traverses jurisdictional
boundaries and reflects a joint effort to resolve ambiguities in, and fill in the gaps
of, a surprisingly uniform set of enabling statutes whose origins can be traced to
efforts centered in, of all places, a federal agency. This is the common law of zoning.
This Article will trace the development of the common law of zoning since
its origins in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Once the idea of dividing
municipalities by means of height, use, and area classifications received the U.S.
Supreme Court’s imprimatur in its 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,1 American local governments throughout the nation swiftly adopted
“Euclidean” zoning schemes under the express authority of state zoning enabling
legislation. During most of the twentieth century, there were many similarities in
those enabling statutes, which is not remarkable given that many of these laws were
based on a model act circulated by a federal agency in the 1920s.2
Much more unexpected has been the fact that state courts asked to adjudge
the validity and applicability of local zoning ordinances, the same tribunals that have
often developed contrasting and conflicting doctrines in the law of real property, 3
have articulated rules and principles that are strikingly similar. This is not to say that
there are no variations from state to state.4 Nevertheless, as this Article explains, on
1.
272 U.S. 365, 379–84, 396–97 (1926).
2.
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS
(1924) [hereinafter SZEA 1924].
3.
For a few of the many examples of such contrasts and conflicts in the
American common law of real property, see for example POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 51.02
(state variations regarding joint tenancies), § 60.04[3][c] (state variations regarding privity
for real covenants), § 64A.04[1] (jurisdictions that recognize trespass by indirect invasion),
and § 91.05[1] (definitions of hostility as an element of adverse possession) (Michael Allan
Wolf gen. ed., 2018). Statutory variations on American real property law are even more
prevalent. See, e.g., id. §§ 14.01–14.07 (variations in fee tail statutes), § 16B.04[3] (warranty
of habitability statutes), § 52.10[3] (variations in tenancy by the entirety statutes), and §§
75.03–75.52 (statutes regarding rule against perpetuities).
4.
There is certainly no requirement that the common law be unswervingly
uniform across state borders. Majority and minority positions abound in the common law of
real property, contracts, and torts, as any overburdened first-year law student seeking the
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many key issues the basic framework of zoning case law varies very little from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from region to region.
Following this Introduction, Part I sets the stage by reviewing a recent
opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa in a case involving a parcel of property that
is iconic, thanks to a motion picture starring Kevin Costner and James Earl Jones.
The court’s decision concerning the Field of Dreams property—Residential &
Agricultural Advisory Committee, LLC v. Dyersville City Council5—raises and
resolves some classic common law of zoning questions concerning “spot zoning,”
the legislative nature of zoning changes, and the relationship between zoning and
comprehensive planning. While the majority of cases featured Iowa citations, at key
points the state supreme court turned to opinions from sibling jurisdictions, or to
principles derived from other state court decisions for guidance.
Part II takes the reader back to the mid-nineteenth century and the
exploration of the idea, expressed memorably by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, that “the rules of the common law, so far as cases
have arisen and practices actually grown up, are rendered, in a good degree, precise
and certain, for practical purposes, by usage and judicial precedent.” 6 Shaw’s oftcited7 conception of a flexible and adaptable common law provides a useful
interpretive lens for analyzing the common law of zoning.
Part III focuses on the intriguing provenance of the initial set of state zoning
enabling acts. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”), drafted and
circulated under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Commerce, provided a
general framework for zoning on the local government level. 8 The SZEA and the
zoning case law it spawned are contrasted with more intricate and detailed uniform
acts, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, that incorporate decisional rules for
courts, and with the American Law Institute’s failed effort in the 1960s and 1970s
to update the SZEA through its Model Land Development Code. There were many
questions that were left unaddressed by SZEA-inspired acts and by the local zoning
ordinances they produced. The answers to those questions that judges (almost
always in state tribunals) proffered, often after sampling decisions from other
jurisdictions, form and reflect much of the common law of zoning.
The gist of the Article is the typology found in Part IV, identifying several
prototypes of the common law of zoning and tracing their origins and evolution: (1)
the illegality of spot zoning; (2) the legislative (or quasi-judicial) nature of zoning
“right” answer would attest. While this Article emphasizes several instances in which courts
from various parts of the nation arrived at similar conclusions, it also highlights questions that
resulted in contrasting approaches. As Stewart Sterk reminded the Author, even in instances
in which judges resolving zoning disputes have arrived at different conclusions, they have
employed a “shared terminology.”
5.
888 N.W.2d 24, 39–46 (Iowa 2016).
6.
Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854).
7.
The popularity of the case is thanks in no small part to its inclusion in the
legendary Hart and Sacks Legal Process materials. See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying
text.
8.
SZEA 1924, supra note 2.
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decisions; (3) the disqualification of variance applications because of self-imposed
hardships; (4) the notion that zoning is about use and not ownership; and (5) the
legitimacy of aesthetic zoning. The process of arriving (or failing to arrive) at
consensus or near-consensus has followed the pattern highlighted by Chief Justice
Shaw nearly two centuries ago, and each of the five examples typifies an aspect of
common-law decision-making found not only in the specific realm of zoning but
beyond.
The conclusion considers how the notion of a common law of zoning helps
us to understand the surprising vitality of height, area, and use classifications even
today, when zoning’s birthday cake holds more than 100 candles.9 While critics have
raised their voices about the evils of height, area, and use controls; and while
commentators have focused their attention on the constitutional and environmental
aspects of land use law; state courts, left to their own devices, have continued to
frame, adapt, and reshape the common law of zoning.

I. A SPOT FOR DREAMS: ZONING CASE LAW IN ITS SECOND
CENTURY
The Dubuque County, Iowa, farm owned by Donald and Rebecca Lansing
provided the setting for the 1989 motion picture Field of Dreams.10 Because of the
film’s enduring popularity, the Lansings welcomed thousands of visitors a year. 11 In
2010, when the Lansings listed their 193-acre property—including the farmhouse,
the diamond visited by specters from baseball’s past, and 193 acres of farmland—
they stipulated that the sale “was contingent upon the property being rezoned for
commercial use, among other things.” 12 One of the “other things” was a condition
that the City of Dyersville would annex the Lansings’ property, 13 which would, of
course, subject the farm to the city’s planning and zoning regime. The purchasers,
Mike and Denise Stillman, also planned “to create an All-Star Ballpark Heaven on
the land, a baseball and softball complex with up to twenty-four fields to be used for
youth baseball and softball.”14
After several months of meetings and hearings, at which nearby residents
and businesses expressed support for and concerns with the Stillmans’ proposal, the
9.
The American Law Institute has commemorated the first century of American
zoning law in its own way, by including zoning and land use regulation in its current
Restatement of the Law Fourth, Property project. Property, THE ALI ADVISER,
http://www.thealiadviser.org/property/ (open the drop-down menu titled “Volume 6:
Servitudes and Land Use”) (last visited June 26, 2019) (noting that Division Three (chapters
29–37) in Volume 6 will be devoted to “Zoning and Land Use Regulation”).
10.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 30.
11.
Id.;
see
also
FIELD
OF
DREAMS
MOVIE
SITE
https://fieldofdreamsmoviesite.com/ (last visited June 26, 2019).
12.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 31; see also Ken Bilson, New Dreams for Field,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at SP-1 (“The Lansings wanted to sell only to someone who would
preserve the authenticity of the field, which has been free to visitors.”).
13.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 33.
14.
Id.; see also ALL-STAR BALLPARK HEAVEN, http://allstarballparkheaven.com
(last visited June 26, 2019).
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Dyersville City Council voted unanimously, on June 18, 2012, to approve a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the City and Go the Distance
Baseball, LLC.15 The MOU provided that the city would use its “best effort” to
annex the Lansings’ property by October 1, 2012 and to “rezone the Property to
commercial use or other appropriate use to allow the Company to use it for its
intended purpose,” to “connect the Property to the city’s water and sewer services
for an estimated cost of $2.48 M[illion],” and to “undertake the authorization of a
development agreement under which the City would agree to make economic
development payments . . . to the Company for a period not to exceed 15 years.”16
Each aspect of the MOU was subject to a separate vote by the city council. 17
On July 2, 2012, the city council passed the annexation resolution by a 4–1 vote and
unanimously approved a “resolution to refer the rezoning of the property from A-1
Agriculture to C-2 Commercial to the planning and zoning commission.” 18 After
hearing from members of the public, the commission, six days later, “unanimously
voted to approve a positive recommendation in favor of the proposed rezoning,” 19
which provided
for the preservation of the existing white farmhouse with wraparound porch overlooking the Field of Dreams, the preservation of
the existing Field of Dreams, and the creation and construction of AllStar Ballpark having a complex featuring 24 baseball and softball
fields targeted for competition and training for youth 8 to 14 and
incidental uses thereof.20

Not surprisingly, despite opposition voiced by some community members
and their attorney, the city council on August 6 voted 4–1 to approve the rezoning.21
On September 4, some of those opponents filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
state district court seeking a stay and an injunction, alleging that by approving the
rezoning “the city council acted in violation of both Iowa law and Dyersville city
ordinances; in excess of its authority; arbitrarily and capriciously; and against public
safety, health, morals, and the general welfare.”22 After taking a detour that included
two stops at the state court of appeals,23 the district court conducted a trial in
February of 2015, issuing an order upholding the actions of the city council three
months later. The opponents filed an appeal, and the Supreme Court of Iowa agreed
to hear the challenge.24
The petitioners before the state high court raised several objections:

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34–36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
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They argue the district court applied the incorrect standard of review
to the city council’s rezoning of the land. They argue the council’s
actions were quasi-judicial in nature rather than legislative, triggering
a different standard of review. They allege Ordinance 770 [the
original rezoning] is invalid for a number of reasons. They also argue
there was sufficient opposition to the ordinance from adjacent
landowners to trigger Dyersville Code section 165.39(5).25 They
assert Ordinance 777 [which corrected an error in the legal
description of the land subject to the rezoning] is invalid because it
purported to rezone property without following proper procedure.
Last, they assert equal protection and due process violations.26

The supreme court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Bruce B. Zager, rejected
all of these arguments, concluding, “[t]he city council acted in its proper legislative
function when it rezoned the Field of Dreams property. Both ordinances were
validly passed, and no procedural or substantive errors affected the decisions of the
city council in its rezoning decisions.”27
The supreme court’s conclusions are neither revolutionary nor remarkable.
Indeed, aside from the novelty of the Hollywood connection, the reason for
including the Dyersville case to open the substantive portion of this Article is the
familiar and commonplace nature of the justices’ approach to answering the
questions of zoning law posed by the All-Star Ballpark Heaven proposal. When
called upon to resolve issues that fall between the cracks of provisions found in state
zoning enabling statutes and local zoning ordinances, the justices, like their
counterparts throughout the nation, did not hesitate to invoke tried-and-true
principles and concepts—the common law of zoning—from within and, more
significantly, from well outside their jurisdiction.
A few examples should suffice. The Iowa high court invoked the transboundary common law of zoning in its determination of whether the rezoning of the

25.

Section 165.39(5) reads as follows:
If the Commission recommends against, or if a protest against such
proposed amendment, supplement, change, modification or repeal is
presented in writing to the Clerk, duly signed by the owners of twenty
percent (20%) or more either of the area of the lots included in such
proposed change, or of those immediately adjacent in the rear thereof
extending the depth of one lot or not to exceed two hundred (200) feet
therefrom, or of those directly opposite thereto, extending the depth of one
lot or not to exceed two hundred (200) feet from the street frontage of such
opposite lots, such amendment, supplement, change, modifications, or
repeal shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of all
members of the Council.
DYERSVILLE,
IOWA,
CODE
OF
ORDINANCES
§ 165.39(5)
(2003),
http://www.cityofdyersville.com/186/Code-of-Ordinances. Visitors to the City of Dyersville
website will see the code (and other features of the website) framed by a photograph of men
in old Chicago White Sox uniforms standing in front of a cornfield.
26.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 39.
27.
Id. at 51.
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farm constituted illegal “spot zoning.” 28 Justice Zager began his discussion with a
quotation from the court’s 2001 decision in Perkins v. Board of Supervisors29 that
defines this key term: “Spot zoning is the creation of a small island of property with
restrictions on its use different from those imposed on surrounding property.”30
Tracing the provenance of this definition would take the researcher to Perkins
(Supreme Court of Iowa, 2001), then to the same court’s 1998 decision in Fox v.
Polk County Board of Supervisors,31 which in turn quoted the court’s 1995 decision
in Kane v. City Council,32 in which the court quoted language from its 1994 decision
in Little v. Winborn,33 which reached back to its 1970 decision in Jaffe v. City of
Davenport.34 The Jaffe court’s definition, the first in this line to use the “small
island” metaphor, derived from the state high court’s ruling in 1954’s Keller v.
Council Bluffs,35 in which the court explicitly noted that the question before the court
“has not been passed upon by this court but has been given consideration in other
jurisdictions.”36 The following paragraph from the Keller decision, replete with
citations to sibling jurisdictions (and a leading treatise), is a wonderful example of
the common law of zoning in action:
‘Spot Zoning’ when construed to mean reclassification of one or more
like tracts or similar lots for a use prohibited by the original zoning
ordinance and out of harmony therewith is illegal. When done under
certain other conditions and circumstances in accordance with a
comprehensive zoning plan such action will not be declared void. It
depends upon the circumstances of each case. Higbee v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320, 128 A.L.R. 734 [1940].
Courts have upheld amendments where established though they
might appear out of harmony with the general plan, because they did
no violence to the spirit and intent of the general zoning ordinance. 1
Zoning Law and Practice 1, 2d Ed. by Yokley (1953), p. 202. Also
see Ellicott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23
A.2d 649, 652 (1942); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y.
221, 177 N.E. 427, 430, 86 A.L.R. 642 (1931).37

The Dyersville court’s ultimate ruling that the city had not engaged in illegal spot
zoning when rezoning the Field of Dreams parcel was truly based on an American
law of zoning.

28.
Id. at 45.
29.
636 N.W.2d 58 (Iowa 2001).
30.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 45 (quoting Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67).
31.
569 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Iowa 1997).
32.
537 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 1995).
33.
518 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Iowa 1994).
34.
179 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1970) (“Spot zoning results when a zoning
ordinance creates a small island of property with restrictions on its use different from those
imposed on the surrounding property.”)
35.
66 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1954).
36.
Id. at 116 (italics omitted).
37.
Id. at 120.
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The common law of zoning also informed the Dyersville court’s
determination of whether the city council’s decision to rezone the property was
legislative or quasi-judicial in nature. The court focused first on statutory provisions,
particularly a code provision mandating that the city council “shall provide for the
manner in which the regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of the [zoning]
districts shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time
amended, supplemented, or changed.”38 Because the statute is silent on the nature
of the rezoning decision (legislative versus quasi-judicial), the court turned to the
case law, noting that “we have also recognized that there are some situations in
which a zoning decision can take on a quasi-judicial nature that may necessitate a
different standard of review than the normally limited standard of review we utilize
when reviewing zoning decisions.” 39
The Iowa case cited as an example of the “different standard of review” is
Sutton v. Dubuque City Council,40 in which a city council “reclassified property
from a commercial recreation district to a planned unit development (“PUD”)
district.”41 As noted by Justice Zager, the Sutton court had
expanded on the two-part test from Buechele [v. Ray42] by citing to
factors identified by the Washington Supreme Court in determining
whether zoning activities are quasi-judicial in nature or legislative in
nature: “(1) rezoning ordinarily occurs in response to a citizen

application followed by a statutorily mandated public hearing; (2)
as a result of such applications, readily identifiable proponents
and opponents weigh in on the process; and (3) the decision is
localized in its application affected a particular group of citizens
more acutely than the public at large.”43
Ultimately, the Dyersville court distinguished Sutton (and the Washington precedent
upon which it relied), concluding that “the city council was acting in a legislative
function in furtherance of its delegated police powers,” doing so by “weigh[ing] all
of the information, reports, and comments available to it in order to determine
whether rezoning was in the best interest of the city as a whole.” 44
A third example of the Dyersville court’s engagement with the common
law of zoning appeared in Justice Zager’s discussion of the Iowa enabling act’s
requirement “that any zoning regulations adopted by a city council or board of
supervisors ‘shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.’”45 The
38.
IOWA CODE § 414.4 (2019) (emphasis added).
39.
Residential & Agric. Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, 888
N.W.2d 24, 40–41 (Iowa 2016).
40.
729 N.W.2d 796, 797 (Iowa 2006) (cited in Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 40–41).
41.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 42.
42.
219 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1974).
43.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 42 (quoting Sutton, 729 N.W.2d at 798). The
Washington decision cited by the Sutton court was Fleming v. Tacoma. 502 P.2d 327, 331
(Wash. 1972) overruled by Rayners v. Leavenworth, 821 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Wash. 1992).
44.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 43.
45.
Id. at 44 (quoting IOWA CODE § 414.3 (2010)).
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opinion noted that “[t]his requirement was adopted to prevent haphazard zoning”
and that its purpose was “to ensure a board or council acts rationally in applying its
delegated zoning authority.”46 The Supreme Court of Iowa decision from 1992 cited
in support of this analysis was Wolf v. City of Ely.47
The Wolf court’s discussion of the “in accordance” requirement reached
back to the 1922 draft of the SZEA,48 and leading cases from New Jersey, Iowa, and
Wisconsin interpreting this key language:
The “comprehensive plan” requirement was imposed to prevent
piecemeal and haphazard zoning. Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act (United States Department of Commerce, § 3 n.22 (1922)). The
word “plan” connotes an integrated product of a rational process; the
word “comprehensive” requires something beyond a piecemeal
approach. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 166,
131 A.2d 1, 7 (1957). We have suggested the purpose of a
comprehensive plan is “to control and direct the use and development
of property in the area by dividing it into districts according to present
and potential uses.” Plaza Recreation Ctr. v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa
246, 258, 111 N.W.2d 758, 765 (1961); see also Bell v. City of
Elkhorn, 122 Wis.2d 558, 564-65, 364 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1985) (list
of objectives sought to be achieved through development of a
comprehensive plan).49

Using these authorities for guidance, the Dyersville court was comfortable affirming
the district court’s finding “that the rezoning was passed in accordance with and in
furtherance of the comprehensive plan, despite none of the council members
expressly linking their votes to the plan.”50
Assured that the city’s handling of the rezoning was sensible, rational, and
in compliance with statutory and “common law of zoning” requirements concerning
these three as well as other relevant issues,51 the Iowa high court affirmed the district
court’s rulings in favor of the local government.

46.
Id. at 45.
47.
493 N.W.2d 846, 849 (Iowa 1992).
48.
See infra text accompanying notes 83–92.
49.
Wolf, 493 N.W.2d at 849.
50.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 45.
51.
For example, the court rejected the petitioners’ claim that by “including a 200foot buffer zone of agricultural land that surrounded the property that was rezoned to
commercial, the city had sought ‘to prevent the nearby property owners from objecting to the
project . . . .’” Id. at 47. The justices noted that “a number of other courts have held that a
council may avoid a supermajority vote requirement by creating a buffer zone between the
property to be rezoned and the land of adjacent property owners.” Id. (citing Schwarz v. City
of Glendale, 950 P.2d 167, 170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v. McInnis, 142 S.E.2d 670,
679 (N.C. 1965); Town of Beech Mountain v. Genesis Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc., 786 S.E.2d
335, 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); St. Bede’s Episcopal Church v. City of Santa Fe, 509 P.2d
876, 877 (N.M. 1973); Eadie v. Town Bd. of N. Greenbush, 854 N.E.2d 464, 467–68 (N.Y.
2006)).
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II. PRECISE AND CERTAIN RULES: CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW’S RECIPE
FOR COMMON LAW
“Common law” is a term and concept whose meaning and import have
shifted significantly over the course of Anglo-American legal history. While a
complete discussion of the origins, meanings, and implications of the term is far
beyond the bounds of this Article, it is important to situate the discussion of the
“common law of zoning” in a specific and, it is hoped, serviceable context. Not to
address this question might result, for example, in an understanding that all case law
qualifies as “common law.” Such an ahistorical, all-encompassing reading would
mean that all statutory interpretations and constitutional analyses undertaken by
courts would qualify. Similarly, to confine the term “common law” to a specific
period, such as prior to the passage of a reception provision in a state constitution or
code by one of the new American states, 52 would, because American zoning is an
early twentieth century development, disqualify any judicial discussion of zoning
principles as “common law.”
Those seeking assistance from U.S. Supreme Court justices will be
disappointed. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., known more for his clever turns
of phrases than for clear guidance to future generations of judges and lawyers,
memorably, but most unhelpfully, quipped, “The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified.”53 Justice Antonin Scalia contrasted “modern
devotees of a turbulently changing common law” 54 with “the theoretical model of
common-law decisionmaking accepted by those who adopted the Due Process
Clause,”55 noting that “common-law jurists believed (in the words of Sir Francis
Bacon) that the judge’s ‘office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and
not to make law, or give law.’”56
Professor John Stinneford, in the course of making his compelling
argument that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

52.

For example, New York’s original constitution (1777) provided as follows:
And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the
good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare that such parts of
the common law of England, and of the statute law of England and Great
Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as
together did form the law of the said colony on the 19th day of April, in
the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall
be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and
provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make
concerning the same . . . .
The Constitution of New York: Apr. 20, 1777, THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
53.
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54.
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 474 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55.
Id. at 472 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56.
Id. (quoting Francis Bacon, Essays, Civil and Moral [1625], in 3 HARVARD
CLASSICS 137 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909)).

2019]

A COMMON LAW OF ZONING

781

“incorporates the common law doctrine of desuetude,” 57 brushes aside the justices’
(and others’) fanciful and misleading notions, explaining:
At the time the Constitution was adopted (and for centuries prior to
that time), the common law was not seen as the product of judges
exercising a “legislative function,” nor was it seen as the series of
fixed, transcendent rules Justice Holmes mockingly described as a
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.” Rather, the common law was
considered to be a kind of customary law—the law of “custom” and
“long usage.”. . . Such laws were considered normatively superior to
laws imposed by the sovereign because long usage guaranteed that
they were reasonable and that they enjoyed the consent of the
people.58

Thus, “custom” and “long usage”59 are terms that more accurately and usefully
isolate the DNA, the essential nature, of the common law.
Nurture, too, plays an important role in the understanding and composition
of the common law, especially in the American context. Environmental factors—
the temporal and geographic setting; the social, political, and economic context;
technological developments; and, perhaps most important, the presence of statutory
or administrative law shaping the contour of the dispute before the court—contribute
to the evolution of as yet unwritten law.
This last observation is far from original. A discerning and very useful
articulation of the adaptive nature of the common law can be found in the opinion
of Chief Justice Shaw in Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad.60 Chief
Justice Shaw was a larger-than-life figure who warranted a detailed study61 of his
long judicial career, a career that featured opinions in notable cases involving topics

57.
John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 531, 532 (2014) (italics omitted).
58.
Id. at 561 (footnotes omitted).
59.
Inevitably the question arises: Just how long is long enough to qualify as “long
usage”? The common-law mode of decision-making consists of trial and error by a variety of
courts over an extended period of time. The life cycle of many Anglo-American commonlaw rules can be measured in centuries, it is true. Nevertheless, the zoning rules explored infra
Part IV (and others as well) derive from the thousands of reported appellate opinions
concerning zoning, from dozens of American jurisdictions, that have been published between
the third decade of the twentieth century and the present. In other words, the trials and appeals
over nearly one hundred years that have yielded longstanding and consistently applied
precedents and have filtered out outlier errors should easily qualify as “long usage.”
60.
67 Mass. 263 (1854); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
480 (1911) (“No more superb statement of the manner in which the principles of the Common
Law are to be adapted to new conditions of modern law has ever been made than by Shaw, in
1854, in a case involving the liability of railroads as warehousemen . . . .”).
61.
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW 3 (1957) (“No other state judge through his opinions alone had so great an influence
on the course of American law. A critical study of his work can illuminate much of the history
of that law in its formative stage.”).
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such as the status of slaves brought to a free state, 62 labor unions,63 police power
regulations of land,64 and the fellow servant rule.65 The issue Chief Justice Shaw
addressed in his 1854 opinion in Norway Plains concerned the liability of a railroad
company for the destruction of a company’s goods that had been shipped by the
railroad, unloaded and placed in a depot, and then destroyed in a fire that consumed
the depot. The Massachusetts high court refused to hold the railroad liable as a
common carrier for damage to goods in transit because to do so “would greatly mar
the simplicity and efficacy of the rule, that delivery from the cars into the depot
terminates the transit.”66
The court’s decision not to attach common carrier liability to this new form
of transportation in this specific set of facts seemed to be a departure from settled
law. This was not the case at all, Chief Justice Shaw asserted, in the process
distancing himself from the more metaphysical notion of the common law as an
autonomous entity fixed in time and space, waiting to be discovered by judges and
other jurists.67 To Chief Justice Shaw and his colleagues, the common law was
expansive, adaptable, and up to the task of meeting modern concerns.
Rather than attempting to paraphrase this great jurist’s turns of phrase,
Chief Justice Shaw should be allowed to speak for himself. First, he observed that
the common law has a great advantage over less flexible written codes:
[I]nstead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive
provisions, and adapted to the precise circumstances of particular
cases, which would become obsolete and fail, when the practice and
course of business, to which they apply, should cease or change, the
common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles,
founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy,

62.
Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193 (1836).
63.
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
64.
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
65.
Farwell v. Bos. & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
66.
Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 276 (1854).
67.
Professor Thomas Grey used Chief Justice’s Norway Plains opinion as a
“classic” example of how “American judges before the Civil War . . . sought guidance, but
not dictation, from general principles.” Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1, 8 n.27 (1983); Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and
Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1244, 1244 n.12 (2015) (citing Norway
Plains in support of their assertion that “the open-ended nature of legal concepts renders them
capable of accommodating different normative values and ideals. It is for this reason that most
common law concepts are structured as legal standards (as opposed to rules).”). Professor
David Strauss, in his important and influential work exploring “common law
constitutionalism,” has observed that “[t]he common law method has not gained currency as
a theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation because it is not an approach we usually
associate with a written constitution, or indeed with codified law of any kind.” David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 885 (1996). The
common law of zoning is a similar pairing of unusual partners.
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modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases
which fall within it.68

Second, while practice and usage in the “real world” are important, Chief
Justice Shaw explained that judges play the most important role in articulating what
the common law is and how it should be applied in future litigation:
These general principles of equity and policy are rendered precise,
specific, and adapted to practical use, by usage, which is the proof of
their general fitness and common convenience, but still more by
judicial exposition; so that, when in a course of judicial proceeding,
by tribunals of the highest authority, the general rule has been
modified, limited and applied, according to particular cases, such
judicial exposition, when well settled and acquiesced in, becomes
itself a precedent, and forms a rule of law for future cases, under like
circumstances.69

Third, to Chief Justice Shaw and his colleagues, the judiciary was capable
of adapting these “general principles” to changing circumstances:
[W]hen new practices spring up, new combinations of facts arise, and
cases are presented for which there is no precedent in judicial
decision, they must be governed by the general principle, applicable
to cases most nearly analogous, but modified and adapted to new
circumstances, by considerations of fitness and propriety, of reason
and justice, which grow out of those circumstances. The consequence
of this state of the law is, that when a new practice or new course of
business arises, the rights and duties of parties are not without a law
to govern them; the general considerations of reason, justice and
policy, which underlie the particular rules of the common law, will
still apply, modified and adapted, by the same considerations, to the
new circumstances.70

In the case before the court, it made little sense to apply the established
rule—that “the carrier of goods by land is bound to deliver them to the consignee,
and that his obligation as carrier does not cease till such delivery” 71—to this new
form of surface transportation. After all, for railroads, the “line of movement and
point of termination are locally fixed,” 72 and as with ships “the merchandise can
only be transported along one line, and delivered at its termination, or at some fixed

68.
Norway Plains, 67 Mass. at 267.
69.
Id. This is an articulation of the attribute of “long usage” identified by
Professor Stinneford. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59; see also Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 40 (2001) (“Even the
usage of the community did not always isolate a single right answer. What really made the
common law’s general principles ‘precise, specific, and adapted to practical use’ was ‘judicial
precedent’—which Shaw defined as ‘judicial exposition’ that had been ‘well settled and
acquiesced in.’”).
70.
Norway Plains, 67 Mass. at 267–68.
71.
Id. at 271.
72.
Id.
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place by its side, at some intermediate point.” 73 Furthermore, “the car cannot leave
the track or line of rails, on which it moves,”74 and, because a stationary car both
prevents the train from moving and blocks the tracks, the goods inside “should be
discharged as soon and as rapidly as it can be done with safety.” 75 In this manner,
the court, applying the general principles of the common law within a new
technological setting, rendered judgment in favor of the railroad.
Thanks to the decision of the legendary law professor duo of Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks to feature the Norway Plains opinion prominently in their highly
influential legal process teaching materials, 76 generations of law students at Harvard
and dozens of other law schools were familiarized with the idea of courts invoking
and reshaping an adaptive and responsive common law. 77
For the purpose of considering the idea and prominent components of a
common law of zoning, and drawing directly from Chief Justice Shaw’s 1854
peroration, we can distill five aspects of American common law:
1. It “consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles, founded
on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy.”
2. It is “modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular
cases which fall within it.”
3. It is “rendered precise, specific, and adapted to practical use, by
usage, which is the proof of their general fitness and common
convenience, but still more by judicial exposition.”

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 386–95 (tent. ed., 1958). Norway Plains
served as Problem No. 11, which was labeled “Decision without Closely Relevant Precedent:
The Case of the Burnt Bundles.” It was the first of two problems in Section 2 (“The ReasonFor-Being of Judicially Declared Law”) of Chapter III (“The Courts as Places of Initial Resort
for Solving Problems Which Fail of Private Solutions”). Id. at 366, 386.
77.
In their introduction to the 1994 Foundation Press edition of The Legal
Process, Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey explained:
Hart and Sacks’ opus has had a great run as teaching materials. It was the
text for a popular perspectives course at the Harvard Law School for more
than three decades, and dozens of other law schools offered similar
courses from the materials during this period. Thousands of law
students . . . studied the materials in the classroom. Some law schools still
teach Hart and Sacks’ The Legal Process as a regular course.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994). See also Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and
Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 61 (2013) (describing the “philosophical backdrop to the teaching
materials”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2047 (1994) (“The Legal Process has influenced new generations
of law professors who never took the course.”).
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4. When a “general rule has been modified, limited and applied,
according to particular cases, such judicial exposition, when well
settled and acquiesced in, becomes itself a precedent, and forms a rule
of law for future cases, under like circumstances.”
5. Cases of first impression “must be governed by the general
principle, applicable to cases most nearly analogous, but modified
and adapted to new circumstances, by considerations of fitness and
propriety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those
circumstances.”78

Before exploring elements of zoning’s common law as they appeared and evolved
in state court decisions from throughout the nation, a slight detour through New
York City municipal government and the U.S. Department of Commerce is in order.

III. A FEDERAL MODEL FOR STATE EXPERIMENTATION
The tapestry of zoning law is highly unusual if not unique in American
jurisprudence. Because the police power—the authority and obligation to protect the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare79—resides at the state level,80 it
could be asserted that cities and other local governments did not have the inherent
power to enact zoning ordinances without state approval. Once New York City, with
the blessing of state lawmakers, passed the nation’s first modern zoning ordinance
in 1916,81 many states and municipalities were anxious to follow suit. Unsure of
whether local governments had the inherent power to segregate residential,
commercial, and industrial uses, the most practical solution was to follow the
examples of states such as New York and Massachusetts82 by passing a state
enabling act specifically authorizing all or selected local governments to use the new
zoning tool. While a few more states took this step on their own initiative, officials
in, of all places, the U.S. Department of Commerce believed that other states might
require assistance and inspiration to jump on the zoning bandwagon.

78.
Norway Plains, 67 Mass. at 267–68.
79.
See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)
(“[T]he reasons [for the city’s passage of a zoning ordinance] are sufficiently cogent to
preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”).
80.
E.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) ( “[T]he States, vested as
they are with general police power, require no specific grant of authority in the Federal
Constitution to legislate with respect to matters traditionally within the scope of the police
power.”).
81.
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 209–10 (N.Y. 1920)
(“The resolution referred to was passed July 25, 1916, pursuant to chapter 466 of the Laws of
1901, as amended by chapter 470 of the Laws of 1914, and as further amended by chapter
497 of the Laws of 1916. The restrictions imposed are due to the so-called Zoning Law.”).
82.
In re Opinion of Justices, 127 N.E. 525, 526 (Mass. 1920) (determining, in an
advisory opinion, that “[a]n Act to authorize Cities and Towns to limit Buildings according
to their Use or Construction to Specified Districts . . . would be legal and constitutional if
enacted into law”).
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Herbert Hoover, serving in the cabinets of Presidents Warren Harding and
Calvin Coolidge, started the ball rolling:
[H]e created the Division of Building and Housing within the
National Bureau of Standards and appointed the able John Gries, a
housing specialist at the Harvard University business school, to head
it. Hoover instructed Gries to consult with others in the housing field
and come up with ways to increase the numbers of homeowners,
improve the mortgage financing system, standardize building
materials, and—most significant for us today—encourage zoning to
protect homeowners from commercial and industrial intrusions.83

Gries appointed a talented group of experts to the newly created Advisory
Committee on City Planning and Zoning, with a subcommittee assigned to draft
what became the SZEA. The original drafting subcommittee included New York
lawyer Edward Bassett, U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative Morris
Knowles, and New York housing expert Lawrence Veiller. 84
Following a survey of existing zoning statutes and local ordinances, the
subcommittee produced several drafts of a model statute beginning in late 1921,
soliciting and receiving suggestions from leading experts. Even the drafts were used
by state lawmakers to craft new enabling legislation. 85 In May 1924, the U.S.
government issued the final version of A State Zoning Enabling Act Under Which
Municipalities Can Adopt Zoning Regulations,86 introduced by Commerce Secretary
Hoover. In his foreword, the future President explained that “[t]his standard act
endeavors to provide, so far as it is practicable to foresee, that proper zoning can be
undertaken under it without injustice and without violating property rights.” 87

83.
Ruth Knack et al., The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning
Acts of the 1920s, 48 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 2, 3 (1996).
84.
Id. at 4. Bassett played major roles in crafting and promoting New York City’s
trailblazing zoning ordinance. Id.
85.
See Newman F. Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 164 (1926).
Baker offered this early scorecard of the success of the SZEA:
[I]t was adopted by eleven states within a year of its issuance in 1922.
Today we find that over half of the states in our country have used it in
drawing up their enactments and it is safe to say that practically all the
states which have provided for zoning have felt its influence.
Id. at 175. Baker also cited examples of states (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania)
that had amended their existing zoning enabling acts to incorporate elements of the SZEA.
Id. at 176–77.
86.
SZEA 1924, supra note 2.
87.
Herbert Hoover, Foreword to SZEA 1924, supra note 2, at III. The
Department of Commerce also published and widely circulated a promotional pamphlet for
zoning. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A ZONING PRIMER (rev. ed.
1926). The 1926 edition included a list of hundreds of “Zoned Municipalities” from 35 states
and the District of Columbia. Id. at 8–10; see also Knack et al., supra note 83, at 6 (“The
Primer turned out to be a popular publication. . . . In less than a month and a half [after its
release], Gries told Hoover, the Commerce Department had distributed over 25,000 copies.”).
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The 1924 version of the SZEA, like the Revised Edition issued two years
later,88 was divided into nine substantive sections. The first part (“Grant of Power”)
in one heavily footnoted sentence: (1) provided the constitutional (police power)
justification for American zoning; (2) resolved any doubt concerning whether local
governments would be delegated the authority to enact zoning ordinances; and (3)
conveyed the main attributes of American zoning:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and
incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the
height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures,
the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts
and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and
use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or
other purposes.89

The remaining sections described the division of municipalities into
separate districts within which regulations and restrictions would be uniform
(“Districts”); provided more details on the health and safety benefits of zoning
(“Purposes in View”); mandated public hearings before promulgation and
amendment of zoning provisions (“Method of Procedure”); created a mechanism for
neighbors to object to zoning modifications (“Changes”); established a regulatory
body to recommend boundary districts and regulations (“Zoning Commission”);
described the make-up and responsibilities of the board charged with hearing and
deciding upon special exceptions, appeals, and variances, and provided for review
of the board’s decisions by writ of certiorari (“Board of Adjustment”); authorized
local governments to implement and use civil and criminal remedies designed to
punish those who violate zoning regulations and to prevent use and occupation of
buildings not in compliance with those regulations (“Remedies”); and established
that, in the event of a conflict between zoning and other land use regulations, the
more restrictive rule (“higher standard”) would prevail (“Conflict With Other
Laws”).90
By the middle of the twentieth century, every state had enacted state
legislation that tracked very closely with the SZEA, 91 incorporating, often with only
88.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS
(rev. ed. 1926).
89.
SZEA 1924, supra note 2, at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).
90.
Id. at 5–12.
91.
See Stuart Meck, Model Planning and Zoning Enabling Legislation: A Short
History, in 1 AMERICAN P LANNING ASSOCIATION, MODERNIZING STATE P LANNING STATUTES:
THE GROWING SMART WORKING PAPERS 1, 3 (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 462/463,
1996) (“[T]he SZEA was adopted by all 50 states and is still in effect, in modified form, in
47 states.”). In his tour de force championing replacements for public controls, Professor
Robert Ellickson observed that “[t]he regulatory framework of zoning ordinances in the
United States is surprisingly uniform.” Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 691
(1973).
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minor variations,92 components found in each of the nine sections of the model act.
This record of adoption and imitation puts the SZEA in the same league as the most
popular uniform or model state laws, such as the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), adopted in whole or in part by all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands,93 and the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (“UTMA”),
included in the codes of all but one of those same jurisdictions. 94
Of course, what distinguishes the SZEA from more “typical” uniform or
model laws is the role that the federal government played in convening the skilled
experts responsible for drafting the provisions, not to mention the Commerce
Department’s wide promotion of the work product, efforts that would probably
make officials at the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) and the American Law Institute (“ALI”) green with envy. Even
decades after the initial push, the provisions of the SZEA are still important
component parts of state zoning statutes, despite efforts by the ALI in the 1960s and
1970s to update and augment this vestige of the Jazz Age through promulgation of
A Model Land Development Code (“MLDC”).95
The MLDC was an ambitious project that offered states a menu of model
statutory provisions from which to choose, on topics ranging from zoning substance
and procedure (with a strong state presence), growth management, eminent domain,
and land banking. Professor Patricia Salkin has offered a brutally honest postmortem for the MLDC: “[T]here was little practical impact realized from this work
beyond the academic exercise of debating drafts and promulgating a model code. In
reality, the Model Code became little more than a shelf document.” 96
In the 1990s, the American Planning Association embarked on its Growing
Smart project, another large-scale effort designed to make land-use planning more

92.
For example, a few states chose the title “Board of Zoning Appeals” to perform
the functions of the “Board of Adjustment.” See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.14
LexisNexis 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-780 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2308 (2012).
93.
U.C.C. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 1 U.L.A. 1–
2 (Supp. 2019).
94.
UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has
Been Adopted, 8C U.L.A. 1–2 (Supp. 2019). The exception, South Carolina, has held onto the
UMTA’s predecessor—the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-5-500
to -600 (2019).
95.
AM. LAW INST., A MODEL LAND DEV. CODE: COMPLETE TEXT AND
COMMENTARY (1976).
96.
Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to Growing Smart: The Transformation of the
American Local Land Use Ethic into Local Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 115 (2002) (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Professor Salkin did
concede that the MLDC “has, however, been influential as persuasive authority in cases in
court and in advocacy positions before state legislatures, to support growth management and
regional planning models.” Id. at 115 n.24; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Fred Bosselman’s
Legacy to Land Use Reform, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 11, 21 (2001) (“History was not
kind to the [MLDC]. Although states have included a few of the ideas in the code in state
legislation, the DRI [developments of regional impact] and especially the critical area
proposals are the only ones that have received serious legislative attention.”).
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efficient with an eye on the prize of sustainability. With talented experts and
consultants such as Stuart Meck, Patricia Salkin, and others, Growing Smart showed
great promise. Yet the economic realities of the Great Recession and its aftermath,
as well as political apathy (at best) toward sustainability, have made it more difficult
for advocates of slowing and managing growth to achieve dramatic and widespread
legislative change.97 So, for better and for worse, most states still in large part cling
to zoning enabling statutes that can be traced directly to the Roaring Twenties. 98
A legitimate question at this point would concern the role the common law
plays in a legal regime that appears to be dominated by legislation, particularly state
legislation adopted by a large number of sibling jurisdictions and local ordinances
that often fall into the same basic patterns. Consideration of other successful model
acts can be of great assistance in answering this question.
The relationship between the common law and uniform laws has three
separate but related dimensions. First, many provisions of uniform acts are designed
to codify preexisting, well-functioning common-law rules. For example, § 9-203(g)
of the UCC (a joint project of the ALI and the NCCUSL) “codifies the common-law
rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on
personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien.” 99 Similarly, the
NCCUSL’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has been adopted by all but two
states,100 “codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret protection,
preserving its essential distinctions from patent law.” 101 The drafters of the
NCCUSL’s Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), used by more than 30 states, explained
that “[m]uch of the [UTC] is a codification of the common law of trusts.”102
97.
See, e.g., Jerry Weitz, The Next Wave in Growth Management, 42/43 URB.
LAW. 407, 408 (2010) (“The initial excitement and feverish paces of state legislative reform
seem to have waned considerably, however, in recent years. And, given the state of the
economy today, it appears unlikely that huge numbers of states will become ‘growth
management states,’ or in other words, those adopting significant state-sponsored programs
aimed at efficient infrastructure and growth management.”).
98.
This is not to say there have been no significant modifications of zoning
statutes or ordinances since the 1920s. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF,
LAND USE PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CASEBOOK 222–29 (2010) (reviewing and
providing examples of “post-Euclidean devices that local and state land use regulators have
devised over the past few decades to add flexibility and responsiveness”); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW §§ 10.01-10.07 (6th ed. 2018)
(describing growth management programs employing devices such as urban growth
boundaries and concurrency requirements).
99.
U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 9, 3 U.L.A. 177 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N
2010).
100.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 14 U.L.A. 170–71 (Supp. 2019).
101.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS Prefatory Note, 14
U.L.A. 531 (2005).
102.
UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note, 7D U.L.A. 4 (2018). Other examples
include UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703, which, according to cmt., 7D U.L.A., at 243, allows cotrustees to act by majority decision (and “rejects the common law rule . . . requiring unanimity
among the trustees of a private trust”); and UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602, 7D U.L.A., at 217–18,
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Second, some uniform acts serve to abrogate or significantly modify
preexisting common-law rules deemed out-of-date, unfair, or inefficient. The
drafters of NCCUSL’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1972, for
example, offered this rationale for their work product (adopted by more than 20
states103):
Existing landlord-tenant law in the United States, save as modified
by statute or judicial interpretation, is a product of English common
law developed within an agricultural society at a time when doctrines
of promissory contract were unrecognized. Thus, the landlord-tenant
relationship was viewed as conveyance of a lease-hold estate and the
covenants of the parties generally independent. These doctrines are
inappropriate to modern urban conditions and inexpressive of the
vital interests of the parties and the public which the law must
protect.104

In like manner, § 705 of the UTC “rejects the common law rule that a trustee may
resign only with permission of the court, and goes further than the Restatements,
which allow a trustee to resign with the consent of the beneficiaries.” 105
The third relationship between uniform statutes adopted by numerous
states and the common law is more complex. At times, judges, in several cases from
numerous jurisdictions over an extended period of time, are asked to resolve
ambiguities in statutory provisions or to address questions that, because they fall
between the lines of the legislation, were not addressed by lawmakers in their final
product. This relationship, unlike the first two described above, constitutes the
common law of a model or uniform act.
Once again the UCC can serve a useful prototype. As Professor Gregory
Maggs has noted,
Drafters of legislation sometimes state rules that accidentally fail to
address certain possible situations that may arise. This type of error
tends to occur when the drafters focus their attention on the most
common fact patterns, and forget about those that occur less

which presumes that an inter vivos trust is revocable unless its terms expressly provide
otherwise (abrogating the common-law presumption to the contrary).
103.
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT OF 1972 Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 7B U.L.A. 269 (2006) (withdrawn and
superseded 2015).
104.
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT OF 1972 § 1.102 cmt., 7B
U.L.A. 278 (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, withdrawn and superseded 2015); see also John E.
Murray, Jr., A Tribute to Professor Joseph M. Perillo: Contract Theories and the Rise of
Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 888 n.87 (2002) (“While it is common for courts to
view U.C.C. § 2-207 as ‘rejecting’ the common law ‘mirror image’ rule of contract formation,
that rule continues with respect to ‘dickered’ terms such as the subject matter and price. Thus,
it is more precise to recognize U.C.C. § 2-207 as a major modification of the ‘mirror image’
rule.”).
105.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 705 (amended 2001) cmt, 7D U.L.A. 251 (UNIF. LAW.
COMM’N 2018).
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frequently. Eventually litigation may cause a court to confront a type
of case that the drafters overlooked.106

The “most famous example” identified by Professor Maggs can be found
in UCC § 2-207:
Section 2-207(1) states that a purported acceptance of an offer may
suffice to form a contract even if it contains additional or different
terms. Section 2-207(2) then states how courts should treat any
additional terms contained in the offer. The section, however,
notoriously fails to specify how courts should treat different terms.
Courts, for many years, have struggled to resolve the question.107

The efforts of state and federal judges to fill in the blanks of this key provision of an
important uniform act that is national in scope is an example of the development of
the “common law” of the UCC.108 In other words, when, over the course of an
extended period of time, a critical mass of judges resolve these ambiguities or fill in
these gaps, in the process citing rulings from their own and other courts and thereby
creating or rejecting precedent, these judges are crafting a common law for this
ubiquitous statutory regime.
American zoning was a new legislative creature that first appeared and
gained a significant foothold in the second decade of the twentieth century. The rules
and procedures comprising the SZEA were not addressed by preexisting common
law. Therefore the first relationship noted above—codification of the common
law—did not exist for this model act. Moreover, the experts who crafted the SZEA,
and those responsible for introducing and shepherding state enabling legislation
resembling and based on that model, could not have intended to abrogate substantive
common-law rules,109 making the second relationship equally inapplicable.110
106.
Gregory E. Maggs, Patterns of Drafting Errors in the Uniform Commercial
Code and How Courts Should Respond to Them, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 81, 90 (2002).
107.
Id. at 90–91.
108.
See id. at 91 n.62 (citing Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569,
1578–80 (10th Cir. 1984), for its survey of “various approaches to the problem”). The
decisions cited by the Daitom court derived from California, Washington, and Michigan
courts, as well as federal courts applying the law of Ohio, Idaho, New York, and Kansas. See
Daitom, Inc., 741 F.2d at 1577–80.
109.
However, see infra notes 184–194 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the maxim that zoning was in derogation of the private property rights of landowners.
110.
While common law private and public nuisance were features of the AngloAmerican legal landscape centuries before New York City implemented zoning, it would be
a gross and inaccurate exaggeration to say that zoning is simply the codification or abrogation
of nuisance. The Author has previously explored the complex and dynamic connections
between the common law of nuisance (private and public) and zoning and other forms of
land-use regulation. See Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Commentary, Euclid Lives:
The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2176 (2002) (noting
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler “appeared during a crucial
transition period in American legal and constitutional history, as statutory and administrative
law began to supplant the common law as the primary source of law governing business and
private property relationships.”); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the “Impenetrable Jungle”:
Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U.
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When, over the past 90 plus years, judges from throughout the nation collectively
resolved the ambiguities in, or filled in the blanks of, state enabling acts and the
zoning ordinances authorized by those strikingly similar statutes, they were, in
accordance with the third relationship, shaping the common law of zoning.111

IV. FIVE COMMON-LAW COMPONENTS OF AMERICAN ZONING
Having established (based on a longstanding and well-respected judicial
exposition) the essential character of American common law, and having considered
the relationship between the zoning enabling acts, particularly those sharing the
substantive and structural elements of the SZEA, it is time to explore several
components of the judicial contribution to the canons of zoning law.
The five Sections that follow do not provide an exhaustive compendium or
restatement. Rather, they serve as a typology featuring examples representing the
major categories of cases comprising the common law of zoning.
A. New Developments on the Ground: Illegal Spot Zoning
Sometimes the common law of zoning addresses situations that arise in
practice that may not have been anticipated by framers of the enabling legislation.
Section 3 of the SZEA, for example, mandated that zoning “regulations shall be
made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” 112 The drafters explained in a
footnote: “This will prevent haphazard or piecemeal zoning. No zoning should be
done without such a comprehensive study.” 113 While the U.S. Department of
Commerce had also convened a body of experts to draft a Standard City Planning
Enabling Act (“SCPEA”), the SCPEA was not as popular as its zoning
predecessor.114 This meant that, even by the 1950s, hundreds of American

J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 11 (1996) (“[T]he links between our centuries-old methods for
reconciling discordant uses—private and public nuisance—and their modern, regulatory
legacies—local land-use regulation and comprehensive federal and state environmental
law—are undeniable and persistent.”).
111.
The Author is by no means the first to note the phenomenon of crosspollination of zoning law across state lines. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!
THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 72 (2015) (“[W]here in-state precedents are not
quite on point, the common law encourages judges to look to other state courts’ decisions.”).
This Article does quibble with Professor Fischel’s additional point that “[c]ourt opinions are
not coordinated with other states by anything like a model statute. Instead, the coordination
comes from the state constitutional provisions that litigants invoke, and these are similar
throughout the states.” Id. Professor Jonathan Rosenbloom has suggested to the Author that
because in an enabling act state legislators are inviting local lawmakers to engage in
complementary lawmaking, there is more room for judicial gloss than with a detailed
substantive act such as the UCC.
112.
SZEA 1924 § 3, supra note 2, at 6.
113.
Id. at 6 n.22.
114.
See Knack et al., supra note 83, at 8 (“By 1930, the Commerce Department
reported that 35 states had adopted legislation based on the SZEA, while the SCPEA had been
used by 10 states in the preparation of 14 different acts.”).
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municipalities were enacting zoning ordinances without preparing a freestanding
document called a comprehensive (or “master”) plan.115
In 1957, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Kozesnik v. Montgomery
Twp.,116 addressed this apparent discrepancy in a case rejecting a challenge brought
against a township that had amended its ordinance to allow rock quarrying. The
court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion “that there can be no comprehensive plan
unless it is evidenced in writing dehors the zoning ordinance itself.”117 Although
acknowledging that “the historical development did not square with the orderly
treatment of the problem which present wisdom would recommend,”118 the court
interpreted the enabling statute’s “in accordance” language generously, concluding
that “no reason is perceived why we should infer the Legislature intended by
necessary implication that the comprehensive plan be portrayed in some physical
form outside the [zoning] ordinance itself.” 119 For the next several decades, state
courts from around the nation debated this question, and a 1994 intermediate
appellate court could take solace in Kozesnik and its progeny from at least ten
jurisdictions, concluding that “the better reasoned cases . . . are those which do not
require a comprehensive plan separate and apart from the zoning ordinance itself.” 120
Perhaps the most prominent example of this aspect of the common law of
zoning is the question of spot zoning, an issue that, as noted in Part I above, arose
in the Field of Dreams litigation. The petitioners in Residential & Agricultural
Advisory Committee, LLC v. Dyersville City Council121 attempted to demonstrate
that by changing the zoning classification of the property from agricultural to
commercial use the city council had engaged in “illegal spot zoning.” 122 The state
supreme court did “acknowledge that the rezoning appears to constitute spot
zoning,” as the surrounding property was used for agricultural purposes and because
the zoning change “created a commercial ‘island’ of property amidst land zoned as
agricultural.”123 But appearances can be deceiving and are not necessarily outcomedeterminative. Applying a “three-prong test for determining whether spot zoning is
valid,”124 the court concluded that the city council was justified in allowing more
intensive use of the property by the new owners.
In considering the allegation that the local legislature had engaged in illegal
spot zoning, the Dyersville court was addressing a potentially troublesome situation
115.
See Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1154, 1157 (1955) (“For the most part, . . . zoning has preceded planning in the
communities which now provide for the latter activity [zoning], and indeed, nearly one half
the cities with comprehensive zoning ordinances have not adopted master plans.”).
116.
131 A.2d 1, 7–8 (N.J. 1957).
117.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
118.
Id. at 7.
119.
Id. at 7–8.
120.
State ex rel. Chiavola v. Vill. of Oakwood, 886 S.W.2d 74, 80–82 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994).
121.
888 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 2016).
122.
Id. at 43.
123.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
124.
Id.
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that arose early in the life of American zoning, a situation that was not directly
addressed by the SZEA or state legislation based on, or sharing great similarities
with, that federal model.125 Section 5 of the SZEA—labeled “Changes”—makes no
distinctions between large- and small-scale amendments: “Such regulations,
restrictions, and boundaries may from time to time be amended, supplemented,
changed, modified, or repealed.”126 In a footnote, the SZEA drafters made the case
for flexibility, explaining that “[i]t is obvious that provision must be made for
changing the regulations as conditions change or new conditions arise, otherwise
zoning would be a ‘strait-jacket’ and a detriment to a community instead of an
asset.”127 What may not have been anticipated was that local legislators in many
municipalities would be too generous in granting zoning classification changes to
owners of small parcels who were then authorized to make more intensive (and
lucrative) use of their properties than their surrounding neighbors. There was also
the possibility that vindictive officials could single out landowners for negative
treatment by changing their zoning classifications to their financial detriment.
The term “spot zone” found its way into the legal lexicon at least by the
1930s, as illustrated by the 1938 decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in
Mueller v. C. Hoffmeister Undertaking & Livery Co.128 In that case, the state high
court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the St. Louis Board of Aldermen had acted
unconstitutionally when it “amended the general zoning ordinance, by passing what
is commonly known as spot zoning bill or ordinance, which changed all of
defendant’s property fronting on Compton Avenue from residence classification to
commercial classification.”129 Contrary to the mortuary owner’s assertion that this
was simply “a valid amendment to the general zoning ordinance,”130 the Mueller
court, citing Missouri and Illinois decisions in support of neighbors who challenged
landowners that benefited from suspect zoning changes, 131 concluded “that the
classification made of defendant’s property in the present case by the spot zone
ordinance was, under the facts, arbitrary and without substantial reason, and that
said ordinance is void.”132

125.
See MANDELKER & WOLF, LAND USE LAW, supra note 98, § 6.27 (“Zoning
statutes and ordinances authorize amendments to the zoning map without differentiating
between ‘spot’ and other types of rezonings.”).
126.
SZEA 1924 § 5, supra note 2, at 7.
127.
Id. at 7 n.30; cf. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local
Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 11
(2010) (“The drafters of the first zoning ordinances and the standard state zoning enabling act
believed that once enacted, the zoning ordinance would resolve most issues, and exceptions
to the zoning would be rare. That has not proved to be the case, for many reasons.”).
128.
121 S.W.2d 775 (1938).
129.
Id. at 776.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 775–77 (citing Wippler v. Hohn, 110 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1937) and
Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 172 N.E. 710 (Ill. 1930)).
132.
Id. at 776.
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Over the course of the succeeding eight decades, state and federal133 courts
have taken various approaches to distinguishing permissible from impermissible
small-scale zoning amendments. Indeed, the “three-prong test” used by the
Dyersville court— “(1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the
police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction
between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property; and (3) whether the
rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan” 134—is a distillation of factors
derived from dozens of opinions written by judges in numerous jurisdictions. 135 Spot
zoning thus serves as an instructive example of Chief Justice Shaw’s idea that when
a “general rule has been modified, limited and applied, according to particular cases,
such judicial exposition, when well settled and acquiesced in, becomes itself a
precedent, and forms a rule of law for future cases, under like circumstances.”136
While defining “spot zoning” and determining its validity remain
challenges for judges and advocates to this day, 137 it is undeniable that spot zoning
was and remains an essential component of zoning law. Moreover, spot zoning
remains the quintessential example of judges shaping the common law of zoning to
address developments on the ground that were not anticipated by statutory drafters.
B. Judicial Review Questions: Zoning Decisions as Legislative (or QuasiJudicial)
Questions of judicial review—particularly determinations of whether
zoning decisions such as amendments, variances, and special use permits are
legislative or quasi-judicial in nature—comprise another substantial segment of the
common law of zoning. Once again, the Dyersville litigation serves as an instructive
133.
See, e.g., Wilcox v. City of Pittsburgh, 121 F.2d 835, 837 (3d Cir. 1941) (“[S]o
the evil of spot zoning and gradual return to original chaos is avoided.”) (footnote omitted).
134.
Residential & Agric. Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, 888
N.W.2d 24, 46 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa
2001)).
135.
See, e.g., Parsons v. Town of Wethersfield, 60 A.2d 771, 773 (Conn. 1948)
(“The finding supports the conclusion that the change in zone was in accordance with a
comprehensive plan for zoning the town.”) (emphasis added); Polk v. Axton, 208 S.W.2d
497, 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948) (“While the City Council has broad powers in respect to zoning,
it is without authority to single out one lot in an amendatory ordinance and arbitrarily remove
therefrom restrictions imposed upon the remaining portions of the same zoning district. There
must be reasonable ground or basis for the discrimination.”) (emphasis added); Esso
Standard Oil Co. v. Town of Westfield, 110 A.2d 148, 152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954)
(“The tenor of the neighborhood cannot be disturbed by wrenching a small lot from its
surroundings and giving it a new rating not germane to an object within the police power.”)
(emphasis added). For discussions of various tests to determine the validity of alleged spot
zoning, see, for example, MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 98, at §§ 6.28–6.31; PATRICIA E.
SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 6A.1–13 (5th ed. 2019); 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR.,
RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 41 (4th ed. 1994).
136.
Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854); see also
supra text accompanying note 65.
137.
See MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 98, § 6.27 (“Probably no term in zoning
jurisprudence is used more frequently by the courts and is less understood than ‘spot
zoning.’”).
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example. The neighboring property owners challenging the rezoning of the Field of
Dreams site alleged that the city “council’s actions were quasi-judicial in nature
rather than legislative,”138 hoping to convince the court not to employ a limited scope
of review.
As noted in Part I, the Dyersville court, after surveying relevant precedents,
opted for the legislative alternative, meaning generous judicial deference to the local
legislature:
Zoning regulations carry a strong presumption of validity. A zoning
regulation “is valid if it has any real, substantial relation to the public
health, comfort, safety, and welfare, including the maintenance of
property values.” If the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is
“fairly debatable,” then we decline to substitute our judgment for that
of the city council or board of supervisors. 139

The provenance of the “fairly debatable” test is none other than Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,140 the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that established the
constitutionality of zoning. Justice George Sutherland wrote for the majority: “If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”141
Over the subsequent 90 plus years, many courts and commentators have
expressed discomfort with the notion that all zoning decisions made by the local
legislature constitute “legislative” decisions that are owed such generous deference.
The Supreme Court of Iowa explained in Dyersville, for example, “that there are
some situations in which a zoning decision can take on a quasi-judicial nature that
may necessitate a different standard of review than the normally limited standard of
review we utilize when reviewing zoning decisions.”142 As noted above,143 one such
situation arose in that same court’s decision in Sutton v. Dubuque City Council,144
involving a city council’s reclassification of land “from a commercial recreation
district to a planned unit development (PUD) district with a residential district
designation.”145 For more than 50 years, American courts throughout the nation have
attempted to draw a defensible demarcation between legislative and quasi-judicial
decisions in zoning cases. While the variations between state court approaches are
greater than in other areas such as spot zoning, the effort to resolve questions
regarding judicial review remains an instructive aspect of the judicial project of
crafting a common law of zoning.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 40.
Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 388.
Dyersville, 888 N.W.2d at 40–41.
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
729 N.W.2d 796 (Iowa 2006).
Id. at 797.
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In her persuasive and influential 1983 article on “piecemeal land
controls,”146 Professor Carol Rose observed that judges did not sit on the sidelines:
“instead of seeing small changes as legislative acts that are judicially reviewable
only for arbitrariness, courts began to say that in making changes, local
governmental bodies were acting in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.”147 The
judicial text that started this ball of confusion rolling was the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Oregon in Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners.148
The Fasano case concerned a successful challenge brought by homeowners
to the Board’s decision to change the zoning classification for a 32-acre parcel from
Single Family Residential to Planned Residential, which would have enabled the
landowner to build a mobile home park. 149 In affirming the trial and intermediate
appellate courts’ ruling in favor of the homeowners, the Supreme Court of Oregon
drew a crucial distinction between legislative zoning decisions made by local
governments and “exercise[s] of judicial authority” by those same elected bodies,
using the instant case as an instructive example:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific
piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are
subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon
constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the
other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific
piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test. An
illustration of an exercise of legislative authority is the passage of the
ordinance by the Washington County Commission in 1963 which
provided for the formation of a planned residential classification to
be located in or adjacent to any residential zone. An exercise of
judicial authority is the county commissioners’ determination in this
particular matter to change the classification of A.G.S. Development
Company’s specific piece of property. 150

There were procedural and substantive components to this distinction.
First, unlike in the legislative setting, the Fasano court placed “the burden of
proof . . . , as is usual in judicial proceedings, upon the one seeking change.” 151
Second, that burden was much heavier:
The more drastic the change, the greater will be the burden of
showing that it is in conformance with the comprehensive plan as
implemented by the ordinance, that there is a public need for the kind

146.
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983).
147.
Id. at 850.
148.
507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
149.
Id. at 25.
150.
Id. at 26.
151.
Id. at 29.
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of change in question, and that the need is best met by the proposal
under consideration.152

Fully cognizant that its position would expose it “to criticism by legal
scholars who think it desirable that planning authorities be vested with the ability to
adjust more freely to changed conditions,” the Oregon high court revealed the key
motivating factor for shifting and imposing these burdens: “[H]aving weighed the
dangers of making desirable change more difficult against the dangers of the almost
irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local
government, we believe that the latter dangers are more to be feared.”153 The dark
underside of zoning—undue influence, favoritism, and bribery—was thus exposed
to the light and confronted by a state supreme court.
Would other state courts follow suit? The answer is “yes, no, and yes and
no.” Within a decade, as chronicled by Professor Rose, the highest courts in Kansas,
Washington, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia had embraced the (quasi-)judicial
characterization of small-scale (piecemeal) zoning amendments. 154 The California
and Minnesota high courts begged off, 155 and the Supreme Court of Michigan
adopted and then abandoned the Fasano approach.156
The development of this aspect of the common law of zoning continued in
subsequent decades, though at a slower pace. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida,
in Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder,157 checked the quasi-judicial box,158
an important move from a state with a burgeoning population whose legislature had
taken a leading role in growth management. 159 In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Alaska, at the beginning of the new century, rejected Snyder: “Courts in some other
jurisdictions have held that small-scale rezonings should be treated as quasi-judicial
proceedings. But we have chosen instead to treat small-scale rezonings as legislative
decisions.”160
Even those jurisdictions that chose not to follow the lead of the Fasano
court in cases involving rezonings were engaged in the process of “making” the

152.
Id. at 29.
153.
Id. at 29–30.
154.
See Rose, supra note 146, at 845 n.18.
155.
See id. at 845 n.19.
156.
Id.
157.
627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
158.
Id. at 474–75 (“[L]egislative action results in the formulation of a general rule
of policy, whereas judicial action results in the application of a general rule of policy . . . .
[T]he board’s action on Snyder’s application was in the nature of a quasi-judicial proceeding
and properly reviewable by petition for certiorari.”).
159.
See, e.g., Nancy Stroud, A History and New Turns in Florida’s Growth
Management Reform, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 398 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (“[I]n
1939, the state population stood at less than 1.8 million, concentrated in several coastal cities.
By 1972, growth had expanded exponentially and Florida was the fastest growing state in the
country, with a population of approximately 6.7 million.”).
160.
Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 21 P.3d 833, 836 (Alaska 2001)
(footnotes omitted) (citing Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474).
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common law of zoning. Moreover, despite some concerns, 161 the judicial project of
drawing meaningful distinctions between legislative and nonlegislative land use
decisions by local governments—in cases involving topics such as zoning referenda,
variances, and special use permits—continues apace.162 In other words, following
Chief Justice Shaw’s formulation, this aspect of the common law of zoning has been
“modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases that fall within
it,”163 even those cases that could not have been anticipated by the judges in Fasano
and other seminal decisions.
C. The Equity of Zoning: Self-Imposed Hardships
Judges in zoning cases, as they have in other disputes over the use of real
property,164 have grafted equitable principles onto the body of zoning law. The
SZEA, like its progeny in state enabling legislation, provided that a Board of
Adjustment, appointed by the local legislature, would have the authority
[t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the
terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,
where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and
so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial
justice done.165

161.
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013
SUP. CT. REV. 287, 342 (2013) (“There are some problems with the legislative/adjudicative
distinction, however. Perhaps most importantly, the boundary between the categories of
legislative and adjudicative is not nearly as clear-cut in the local government arena as it may
be in other contexts.”). Professor Nestor Davidson has prodded the Author to consider why
some common law of zoning aspects (such as spot zoning) gain more traction than others
(such as the Fasano distinction for rezonings). My initial impression is that structural and
jurisdictional innovations occupy a position closer to the legislative portion of the
governmental spectrum, which could explain why judges wary of charges of judicial activism
stay on the sidelines. This would be a fruitful avenue for further research.
162.
See, e.g., City of Cumming v. Flowers, 797 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. 2017) (“This
case involves the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a
variance request may be appealed to the superior court.”); Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v.
City of Cuyahoga Falls, 697 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio 1998) (“The passage by a city council of
an ordinance approving a site plan for the development of land, pursuant to existing zoning
and other applicable regulations, constitutes administrative [not legislative] action and is not
subject to referendum proceedings.”); Armstrong v. Turner Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 772
N.W.2d 643, 650–51 (S.D. 2009) (“[A] local zoning board’s decision to grant or deny a
conditional use permit is quasi-judicial and subject to due process constraints.”).
163.
Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854); see also
supra text accompanying note 69.
164.
Perhaps the best example, and the one most relevant to zoning, is the way in
which courts developed the notion of an equitable servitude, a theory that enables a party
benefiting from a restrictive covenant to enforce that covenant against one who took
ownership with knowledge of the restriction, even though the legal formalities for
enforcement were lacking. See, e.g., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 60.01[4].
165.
SZEA 1924 § 7, supra note 2, at 10.
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The ease with which applicants have been able to convince board members of the
presence of an “unnecessary hardship,” and thereby secure a variance from use,
height, and area restrictions, has long caused concern among legal and planning
commentators.166
Judicial recognition of the problem came early, as illustrated by the 1927
opinion of Chief Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo of the Court of Appeals of
New York in People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh.167 The
state high court found that New York City’s Board of Appeals had improperly
granted a variance to a landowner who “wished to build a garage upon the southerly
150 feet of his total plottage, but the zoning law forbade.”168 In support of its ruling,
the Board noted the existence of a garage adjoining the applicant’s parcel, explaining
that “‘[t]he existence of said garage which accommodates approximately 180 cars
is sufficient justification to permit another garage next door.’”169
The unanimous court could find no evidence in the record “that this land,
if not occupied by a garage, is incapable of application to profitable use.” 170 Chief
Judge Cardozo showed little sympathy for the landowner who acquired the property
with notice of the residential restriction and who probably paid a reduced price for
that reason.171 Tellingly, he noted, “[t]here has been confided to the board a delicate
jurisdiction and one easily abused.”172 Seeing no evidence in the record that the
zoning scheme had imposed upon this landowner an “unnecessary hardship,” the
court invalidated the variance.
Concern that landowners were taking undue advantage of the empathy of
their neighbors on the board of adjustment (known as the board of zoning appeals
in some jurisdictions173) eventually led courts to develop a new rule that variance
applicants would be disqualified if the only hardship they could demonstrate was
self-created or self-imposed. Josephson v. Autrey,174 a 1957 decision of the Supreme
Court of Florida, is a good representative of this class of cases. After the appellees

166.
See, e.g., Robert M. Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals—Villain or
Victim?, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353, 354, nn.9–14 (1962) (citing criticisms beginning in the
1920s); Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273, 273 (1962) (“With increasing vigor critics have charged
that boards of adjustment pay little attention to the legal limitations on their powers and
operate without safeguards adequate to assure citizens of equal treatment.”).
167.
155 N.E. 575 (N.Y. 1927).
168.
Id. at 576–77.
169.
Id. at 577 (quoting board hearing proceedings).
170.
Id.
171.
Id. (“Presumably this owner, who acquired the parcels with notice of the
zoning resolution, paid a consideration appropriate to the limitation of the use. There is no
element of the unexpected or the incalculable to aggravate his plight.”).
172.
Id. at 578.
173.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2308(A) (2012) (“Every locality that has
enacted or enacts a zoning ordinance pursuant to this chapter or prior enabling laws shall
establish a board of zoning appeals that shall consist of either five or seven residents of the
locality. . . appointed by the circuit court for the locality.”).
174.
96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957).
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purchased a parcel of land in Daytona Beach, the zoning for the neighborhood was
changed from residential use to a zoning classification that allowed motels and
accommodations for tourists. This was not good enough for the appellees, who
hoped to build a gasoline filling station on the site. Rather than asking the local
legislature for a rezoning, the appellees sought a use variance 175 from the zoning
board of appeals. A neighboring landowner challenged the board’s decision to grant
the variance, and the trial court affirmed. The neighbor had better luck in the
supreme court, which was troubled by the fact that the appellees had “contended
‘hardship’ solely on the basis that the land was not worth what they paid for it
burdened by the use restriction which they knew to be in existence when they bought
the property.”176
The Josephson court, citing Florida cases and decisions from New York,
New Jersey, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Minnesota, explained that “[w]hen the
owner himself by his own conduct creates the exact hardship which he alleges to
exist, he certainly should not be permitted to take advantage of it.” 177 The court
accurately noted that “[t]he authorities are generally in accord on the proposition
that in seeking a variance on the ground of a unique or unnecessary hardship, a
property owner cannot assert the benefit of a ‘self-created’ hardship.”178 As the
phrases “self-created hardship” and “self-imposed hardship” had first appeared in
the variance context in New York intermediate appellate and trial court cases from
1942 and 1950,179 the principle and the terminology had thus spread widely and
swiftly.
There being no language in the enabling legislation disqualifying variance
applicants who appeared to be gaming the zoning system, American courts, as had
English courts a century before in the covenant context, 180 exercised their equitable
powers181 and considered the applicant landowner’s knowledge of the land use
175.
See, e.g., Alumni Control Bd. v. City of Lincoln, 137 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Neb.
1965) (“A use variance is one which permits a use other than that prescribed by the zoning
ordinance in a particular district,” while an area variance “is primarily a grant to erect, alter,
or use a structure for a permitted use in a manner other than that prescribed by the restrictions
of the zoning ordinance.”).
176.
Josephson, 96 So. 2d at 789. Professor William Fischel reminded the Author
that such behavior is the classic bootstrap that is universally condemned by judges and
economists alike.
177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
See Thomas v. Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 33 N.Y.S.2d 219, 222 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1942) (“In no event may such a self-created hardship be made the basis for a
variance . . . .”); Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Vill. of Hewlett Bay Park, 102 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (“[T]he plaintiff could not obtain a variance for it could not prove that
any hardship was not self-imposed.”).
180.
The key, if not seminal case is Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144
(Ch) (“[N]othing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to
sell the property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed
to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken.”).
181.
See, e.g., Hydeck v. Suffield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 91-P-2319,
1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1017, at *15 (Mar. 6, 1992) (Nader, J., concurring) (“[T]he appellee

802

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:771

restriction before acquiring the property a key factor in deciding whether to bind
that owner to the terms of the restriction. Over time, to quote Chief Justice Shaw,
this rule was “rendered precise, specific, and adapted to practical use, by usage,
which is the proof of their general fitness and common convenience, but still more
by judicial exposition.”182 Moreover, state lawmakers apparently took note, as
several legislatures subsequently incorporated this rule into the variance provisions
of their enabling legislation.183
D. Maxims and Motifs: Derogation, Use, and Ownership
One of the more familiar (and quaint and curious) practices of judges
formulating the common law has been the invocation of legal maxims. About these
oft-used phrases (frequently though not necessarily in Latin)—which are known
pejoratively as platitudes, truisms, or chestnuts—law professor Jeremiah Smith
memorably wrote in 1895:
The truth is, that there are maxims and maxims; some of great value,
and some worse than worthless. And the really valuable maxims are
peculiarly liable to be put to wrong use. . . . How common it is to meet
with decisions on important points, where the only hint at an
expression of the ratio decidendi consists in the quotation, without
comment, of a legal maxim!184

Smith’s skepticism echoed in Columbia law professor (and legal-realist
lion) Karl Llewellyn’s (in)famous 1950 article deconstructing The Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed: “When it comes to presenting a proposed
construction in court, there is an accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument
over points of case law, the accepted convention, still, unhappily requires discussion
as if only one single correct meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing
canons on almost every point.”185
board may have relied, in part, on the fact that the hardship was self created. The equities of
appellant’s conduct may be weighed pursuant to the seventh factor promulgated in Duncan
[v. Vill. of Middlefield, 491 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ohio 1986)] (i.e., that ‘substantial justice’ be
done).”); see also Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. L. REV. 13,
19 (1895) (“Indeed, the adoption by the common law of many doctrines which were originally
purely equitable, has been so complete that it has often been seriously, though unsuccessfully,
contended that the jurisdiction originally exercised by courts of equity in like cases should
now be regarded as abrogated.”).
182.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
183.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 10-9a-702 (LexisNexis 2012) (“[T]he
appeal authority may not find an unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or
economic.”); see also SALKIN, supra note 135, at § 13:16 n.1 (list of similar statutory
provisions).
184.
Smith, supra note 181, at 13.
185.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950); see
also Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1328 (2018)
(footnote omitted) (“At least since Professor Karl Llewelyn’s famous exposition in 1950,
canons have always been part of the intellectual debate over statutory interpretation. Are there
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In fact, one of the most popular zoning maxims cited with regularity by
state courts is a variation of one of Llewellyn’s canons: “Statutes in derogation of
the common law will not be extended by construction.” 186 The earliest sighting of
the zoning version of this maxim came in a 1932 decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, a case involving property owners who had been given permission
to install gasoline pumps on their property before a city’s zoning ordinance went
into effect.187 The question before the court concerned whether the landowners, by
“the placing of a grease dispenser and certain merchandise upon the premises” had
“started” activities that could be deemed “construction” on the site within the 90day period specified in the new ordinance.188 The court read the ordinance narrowly,
in accordance with the principle that “[z]oning ordinances are in derogation of the
right of private property, and where exemptions appear in favor of the property
owner, they should be liberally construed in favor of such owner.” 189 Three years
later, the New York Court of Appeals offered this variation in a case involving
permission to lower the curb to allow access to parking: “The zoning ordinance is
in derogation of common law rights to the use of private property. Its provisions
should not be extended by implication.”190 By the end of the next decade, state high
courts in New Jersey, Maryland, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arizona, and
Connecticut had climbed aboard the derogation bandwagon, often citing decisions
from courts far and wide. 191
Although some courts have taken a more deferential stance to the
legislative branch,192 most other state high courts have at least recited the maxim
too many? Are they simply tools for post-hoc justification of what is really result-oriented
judging?”).
186.
Llewellyn, supra note 185, at 401.
187.
In re W.P. Rose Builders’ Supply Co., 163 S.E. 462, 463 (N.C. 1932).
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 464.
190.
Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 194 N.E. 848, 850 (N.Y. 1935).
191.
The key cases, arranged chronologically, include Bronston v. Plainfield, 194
A. 809, 810 (N.J. 1937); Landay v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 196 A. 293, 296 (Md. 1937)
(citing Levy); 440 E. 102nd St. Corp. v. Murdock, 34 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1941); City of
Little Rock v. Williams, 177 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Ark. 1944) (citing Murdock); Modern
Builders, Inc. v. Bldg. Inspector, 168 P.2d 883, 885 (Okla. 1946) (citing Landay,
distinguishing Howard); Carrere v. Orleans Club, 37 So. 2d 715, 720 (La. 1948) (citing
Murdock, City of Little Rock, and several other cases); Kubby v. Hammond, 198 P.2d 134,
138 (Ariz. 1948) (citing City of Little Rock and Murdock); Langbein v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
67 A.2d 5, 7 (Conn. 1949) (quoting In re W.P. Rose Builders’ Supply Co.).
192.
See, e.g., City of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626, 635 n.31 (Alaska 1979)
(curiously referring to derogation as the “minority rule”); Women’s Christian Ass’n v. Brown,
190 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Mo. 1945) (“Defendants also contend for the rule of strict construction
of zoning laws because they are in derogation of common law. That rule was abolished in this
state in 1917.”); Howard v. Mahoney, 106 P.2d 267, 269 (Okla. 1940) (“There are authorities
to the effect that zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common-law rights to use property
so as to realize its greatest utility ([Levy]), and should not be extended by implication to cases
and situations clearly not within the scope of the purpose and intent manifest in the language
([Landay]); but there are also authorities to the effect that such ordinances will be given a
reasonable and fair construction in the light of the subject dealt with and the manifest intention
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favorably.193 Even in the age of the sharing economy, the bandwagon is not losing
speed, as illustrated by the opinion of a New York appellate tribunal in an
unsuccessful zoning challenge to a homeowner who “began listing the property on
the Internet offering to rent it for terms ranging from one night to a month or an
entire season.”194 Treatise writers, too, have acknowledged the popularity of the
derogation maxim,195 while cautioning that, as with most maxims, its recitation by

of the lawmakers. Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305, 79 A.L.R. 912, [(1931)], and
other cases.”); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.010(1) (West 2019) (“[B]ut no act of the general
assembly or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the
courts of this state, for the reason that it is in derogation of, or in conflict with, the common
law, or with such statutes or acts of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, or laws,
shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.”).
193.
The key cases, arranged chronologically, include Lukens v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 80 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. 1951); Red Acres Imp. Club, Inc. v. Burkhalter, 241
S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tenn. 1951); Toulouse v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 87 A.2d 670, 673
(Me. 1952); Purdy v. Moise, 75 S.E.2d 605, 607 (S.C. 1953); Lamothe v. Zoning Bd. of
Review of Cumberland, 98 A.2d 918, 920 (R.I. 1953); Hauser v. Arness, 267 P.2d 691, 698
(Wash. 1954) (quoting Landay); City of Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 70 N.W.2d 62, 65 (S.D.
1955) (quoting Levy); Morin v. Johnson, 300 P.2d 569, 571 (Wash. 1956) (citing Hauser and
Kubby); In re Willey, 140 A.2d 11, 14 (Vt. 1958) (citing Toulouse); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.
McNally, 95 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Neb. 1959); Lane Cty. v. R. A. Heintz Constr. Co., 364 P.2d
627, 630 (Or. 1961); Ridgewood Land Co. v. Simmons, 137 So. 2d 532, 535 (Miss. 1962);
Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 448 P.2d 209, 219 (Idaho 1968); Cohen v. Dane
County Bd. of Adjustment, 246 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Wis. 1976); Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque,
575 P.2d 1340, 1342 (N.M. 1977) (citing Kubby); In re Appeal of Univ. Circle, Inc., 383
N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio 1978); Cty. of Lake v. First Nat’l Bank, 402 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill.
1980); Batalden v. Cty. of Goodhue, 308 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. 1981); Carl M. Freeman
Assocs., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Del. 1982); Whistler v. Burlington N. R.R., 741
P.2d 422, 425 (Mont. 1987); Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d
1315, 1330 (Haw. 1998); Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of Jackson, 39 P.3d 397, 404
(Wyo. 2002); Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cty. Area Plan Comm’n, 819 N.E.2d
55, 66 (Ind. 2004); Fulton Cty. v. Action Outdoor Advert., JV, LLC, 711 S.E.2d 682, 686
(Ga. 2011).
194.
Fruchter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 20 N.Y.S.3d 701, 702 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015). The court chose not to adopt a deferential posture, noting, “[s]ince ‘zoning restrictions
are in derogation of the common law . . . [they] are strictly construed against the regulating
municipality.” Id. at 703 (quoting Saratoga Cty. Econ. Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Vill. of
Ballston Spa Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 977 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. (2013)).
195.
See, e.g., MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 98, § 1.13 (“Another rule that
influences land use cases, although it appears out of place in modern legal jurisprudence, is
the rule that a court must construe zoning ordinances strictly because they are in derogation
of property rights.”); 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., supra note 135, § 5:03(3)(a) (“Since a zoning
law or ordinance is in derogation of the owner’s common law rights in the use of his land,
most state courts hold that ordinance provisions will be construed in favor of the free use of
land.”); SALKIN, supra note 135, at § 41:4 (“The rule requiring strict construction of
regulations in derogation of the common law is recited in most opinions relating to the
meaning of words found to be ambiguous.”).
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judges does not necessarily determine or indicate the substantive outcome of the
case.196
American zoning law features another maxim—that zoning concerns use,
not ownership—which serves as a kind of leitmotif for the entire field. Indeed, this
maxim serves as a valuable example of Chief Justice Shaw’s “broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public
policy.”197 The idea actually appears to precede its most familiar formulation, as
illustrated in a 1945 decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Olevson v.
Zoning Board of Review.198 The court reversed the grant by the town council (sitting
as a zoning review board) of a “petition for variations and exceptions,” which would
have permitted a potential purchaser of the property in a restricted residential district
(Duffy) to operate a boarding and rooming house on the condition “that the variation
or exception shall apply only to Duffy personally and shall not run with the real
estate or pass to his heirs, devisees, lessees or assigns.” 199
The Olevson court was not troubled by either the availability of “variances
and exceptions” or by the practice of imposing conditions thereon.200 What struck
the court as “unusual and peculiar,” and ultimately improper, was the personal
nature of the condition: “The variation or exception as granted is made applicable to
Duffy as such vendee, and the condition attached to such grant is plainly personal to
Duffy himself, instead of being attached to the use of the Thompson property as
such.”201 This was problematic, the court explained, because the zoning board of
review was “concerned fundamentally only with matters relating to the real estate
itself then under consideration and with the use to be made thereof, but not with the
person who owns or occupies it.”202
Ten years later, James Metzenbaum, in the second edition of his early
zoning treatise, cited Olevson for the proposition that “the ‘use’ limitation may be
said to be the cardinal and primary motif of comprehensive zoning; not its
ownership.”203 Metzenbaum had established his zoning bona fides by successfully
representing the Village of Euclid in its defense of zoning in the U.S. Supreme

196.
See, e.g., MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 98, § 1.13 (“The rule survives, but
its impact is more limited than its statement suggests, as courts usually apply the strict
construction rule only when they interpret definitions and restrictions in zoning ordinances.”);
SALKIN, supra note 135, § 41:9 (“In fact, each rule of construction may be matched by its
opposite, leaving the entire matter to the unfettered discretion of the court.”); 1 EDWARD H.
ZIEGLER, JR., supra note 135, § 5:03(a) (“[T]his rule of construction favoring the free use of
land should not be applied where common sense indicates the result would be contrived,
unreasonable, or absurd in view of the manifest object and purpose of the ordinance.”).
197.
Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854); see also
supra text accompanying note 69.
198.
44 A.2d 720 (R.I. 1945).
199.
Id. at 721–22.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 722.
202.
Id.
203.
1 JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 12 (2d ed. 1955).
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Court,204 four years before The Law of Zoning first hit the shelves.205 Metzenbaum
even gets credit for inspiring a more familiar articulation of this maxim: two years
after Olevson, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Abbadessa v. Board
of Zoning Appeals,206 protecting the continuation of a nonconforming use, cited the
first edition of The Law of Zoning for the proposition that “[z]oning is concerned
with the use of specific existing buildings and lots, and not primarily with their
ownership.”207
Over the succeeding seven decades, the use-not-ownership maxim would
appear in numerous decisions from throughout the nation, in cases involving not
only conditions208 and nonconformities,209 but also certificates of occupancy, 210
residential use restrictions,211 change of ownership of an approved development, 212

204.
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926); see also
MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 49–53, 57–63, 65–74,
89–93 (2008).
205.
JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING (1930).
206.
54 A.2d 675 (Conn. 1947).
207.
Id. at 677 (citing METZENBAUM, supra note 205, at 14).
208.
In addition to Olevson, see for example Preston v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 154
A.3d 465, 468 (R.I. 2017) (“The fourth condition explicitly provides that . . . ‘if the
[Sposatos] sell this property the next owners are not permitted to keep alpaca.’ However, it is
a basic principle that a zoning authority is not free to impose such a condition on the use of
land.”).
209.
In addition to Abbadessa, see for example Arkam Mach. & Tool Co. v. Twp.
of Lyndhurst, 180 A.2d 348, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (“Appellants contend that
there has been an enlargement of the nonconforming use because the premises are now
occupied and used by two different manufacturing concerns, whereas prior to the enactment
of the zoning ordinance only one manufacturing company occupied and used said premises.
This argument, standing alone, is invalid.”); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. N. Salt Lake City, 431
P.2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967) (“Lawful existing nonconforming uses are not eradicated by a
mere change in ownership. The very nature and use of an extractive business contemplates
the continuance of such use of the entire parcel of land without limitation or restriction of the
immediate area excavated at the time the ordinance was passed.”); Vt. Baptist Convention v.
Burlington Zoning Bd., 613 A.2d 710, 711 (Vt. 1992) (“The fact that plaintiff’s activities are
church-related does not alter the actual use of the property. Furthermore, the use proposed by
the prospective purchaser is the same as plaintiff’s current use of the property.”).
210.
See, e.g., Watergate W., Inc. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 815 A.2d 762,
767 (D.C. 2003) (“No provision exists, in the regulations or elsewhere, which would justify
such differentiation between universities and private parties in their use of property located
off campus.”).
211.
See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Poe, 168 A.2d 193, 196–97 (Md. 1961) (“We
conclude therefore that the principal use which this fraternity is making of the premises in
question does not constitute a ‘service customarily carried on as a business’ under the zoning
ordinance.”); Town of Castine v. Me. Mar. Acad., No. CV-07-085, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS
11, at *2–3 (Jan. 13, 2009) (“MMA [a post-secondary school] is no more restricted from
owning and maintaining a residence in Village District III than any other person or entity.”).
212.
See, e.g., ML Plainsboro Ltd. Partnership v. Twp. of Plainsboro, 719 A.2d
1285, 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (“The Planning Board cannot dictate to
perpetuity who can use, buy, own or rent the properties—as a single or multiple owner.”).
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state immunity from zoning ordinances, 213 owner occupation requirements,214
development by multiple owners,215 conditional use permits,216 and short-term
rentals.217
That the use of maxims is a favorite of common-law judges is undisputed,
which makes the derogation and use-not-ownership decisions yet another marker of
the common law of zoning. Still, whether these zoning law maxims are merely
shortcuts for analysis or mandates requiring adherence is subject to debate. Indeed,
in a recent survey of the use of canons of construction by current federal appellate
judges, the two authors apparently differed over this key inquiry: “Is the mere fact
that canons may provide a common language for parties in the legal system to talk
about statutory cases enough to justify their use, even if judges do not really have a
justification for which ones are used and why?”218 Answering “emphatically ‘no’”
was none other than the prolific and widely cited former judge Richard Posner. 219
E. Evolving Rules: Aesthetic Zoning
Like so many other examples of social engineering crafted by experts
during the Progressive Era,220 height, area, and use zoning garnered its fair share (at
213.
See, e.g., Dearden v. Detroit, 269 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Mich. 1978) (“We reject
the city’s contention that the archdiocese, as a private lessor, cannot claim immunity from
defendant’s zoning ordinance even if its lessee is immune . . . .”).
214.
See, e.g., City of Wilmington v. Hill, 657 S.E.2d 670, 672 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008) (“Plaintiff only is entitled to regulate the use of defendant’s single-family residence
with the accessory use of a garage apartment, not the ownership.”); Beers v. Bd. of
Adjustment, 183 A.2d 130, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1962) (“Defendants do not even suggest, nor
do we believe they properly could, that owner-occupation of a dwelling is a different use of
the property in a zoning sense from tenant-occupation, the actual occupancy of the residence
in either case being by a single family.”).
215.
Feinberg v. Southland Corp., 301 A.2d 6, 11 (Md. 1973) (agreeing with lower
court that “‘the development of lands by combining dual owners must be carried out as fully
in accordance with the development plan as is land being developed by a single owner.’”).
216.
See, e.g., Graham Court Assocs. v. Town Council of Chapel Hill, 281 S.E.2d
418, 422 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]he petitioner here is not required to apply for or receive
a special use permit in order to convert its tenant occupied apartments to owner occupied
apartments.”); In re Sardi, 751 A.2d 772, 774 (Vt. 2000) (“The fact that the facility may also
be classified as a private club does not affect the actual use of the property, which will be as
a lodge.”).
217.
See, e.g., Dawson v. Holiday Pocono Civic Ass’n, 36 Pa. D. & C. 5th 449, 454
(C.P. 2014) (“Common sense dictates that the right to lease these homes, especially on a shortterm basis, is important . . . . To [“relinquish this right”] by zoning is prohibited as a matter
of law since the regulation of the exercise of ownership rights is distinct from the regulation
of how property is used.”).
218.
Gluck & Posner, supra note 185, at 1329.
219.
Id.
220.
Perhaps the most notorious examples of flawed programs championed by
some Progressives (often with other Progressives in the opposition) involved eugenics and
immigration restriction. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Progressives: Racism and Public
Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 947, 949 (2017) (conceding that “many Progressives” were racists, and
that “[s]ome Progressives also held strongly exclusionary views about immigration and
supported the sterilization of perceived mental defectives,” but also pointing out that
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least) of serious criticisms. Judge D.C. Westenhaver, who wrote the lower federal
court opinion declaring unconstitutional the zoning ordinance of the Village of
Euclid, Ohio, offered one of the most incisive and prescient critiques of this new
land planning device. In his opinion, which suffered reversal at the hands of the
Supreme Court majority (despite the best efforts of Newton D. Baker, the
landowner’s counsel and the judge’s former law partner221), Westenhaver criticized
the potential use of zoning to exclude people based on socioeconomic status and the
arbitrary nature of land regulations based on subjective notions of beauty:
In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the
population and segregate them according to their income or situation
in life. The true reason why some persons live in a mansion and others
in a shack, why some live in a single-family dwelling and others in a
double-family dwelling, why some live in a two-family dwelling and
others in an apartment, or why some live in a well-kept apartment and
others in a tenement, is primarily economic. . . . Aside from
contributing to these results and furthering such class tendencies, the
ordinance has also an esthetic purpose; that is to say, to make this
village develop into a city along lines now conceived by the village
council to be attractive and beautiful.222

In the nine decades since these words appeared, American courts, counsel, and
commentators have wrestled with these and other negative attributes of zoning.
The struggle against zoning’s exclusionary character has been waged in
state and federal courthouses and legislative chambers. Prompted in part by the
warnings and concerns of respected voices such as Professors Charles Haar 223 and
Norman Williams,224 several state courts attempted to rein in the most egregious
“Progressives inherited these views, and they were not appreciably different from those held
by most of their non-Progressive predecessors and contemporaries.”).
221.
On the relationship between Baker and Westenhaver, see WOLF, supra note
204, at 49–51.
222.
Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d,
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
223.
See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne
Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (1953) (“Yet segregation of many kinds is on
the increase in the land-use field.”). Examples of judges’ recognition of Haar’s concerns
include S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 735 (N.J. 1975)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel I] (Pashman, J., concurring) (noting that “even those sympathetic
to the goals and methods of zoning began to express concern” about its potential to segregate
based on social and economic factors); and Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401, 407 (N.J.
1955) (“We are aware of the extensive academic discussion following the decisions in [earlier
New Jersey minimum-building-square-footage and large-lot-size] cases, and the suggestion
that the very broad principles which they embody may intensify dangers of economic
segregation which even the more traditional modes of zoning entail.” (citation omitted)).
224.
See, e.g., Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 345 (1955) (noting that provisions mandating minimum
building sizes “are partly snob zoning, and partly a rather extreme example of aesthetic
zoning, heavily interrelated with snob attitudes”). Examples of judges’ recognition of
Williams’s concerns include Vickers v. Twp. Comm. of Gloucester., 181 A.2d 129, 141 (N.J.
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practices of local governments to use their zoning power to keep out those on the
lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. The most prominent and controversial
responses have come from the Supreme Court of New Jersey in its decades-long
Mount Laurel litigation.225 This saga226 continued even after the Garden State’s
legislature finally responded to judicial activism by passing a Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”) that created an affordable housing agency, 227 and, most recently, the court
has retaken the initiative after the failure of the other branches to live up to their
earlier commitments.228
Nevertheless, even though it has much in common with the other examples
discussed in this Article, the judiciary’s struggle against exclusionary zoning does
not fit comfortably within the framework of the common law of zoning. New
Jersey’s high court, in its first bite of the Mount Laurel apple,229 disagreed with the
idea that, “a developing municipality like Mount Laurel may validly, by a system of
land use regulation, make it physically and economically impossible to provide low
and moderate income housing in the municipality for the various categories of
persons who need and want it . . . .”230 The basis for this dramatic ruling was neither
the specific language of the state enabling act nor judicial attempts to interpret or
read between the lines of that legislation. The New Jersey court instead based its
ruling on the interpretation of provisions of its state constitution.231 Such was also

1962) (Hall, J., dissenting) (“What action is not legitimately encompassed by that [zoning]
power and what is the proper role of courts in reviewing its exercise? . . . In the broad sense
the considerations are well posed [by Williams].”); Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., 300 A.2d 107, 114 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (“Despite its recent notoriety, the
exclusionary use of zoning was first noted in the lower court’s opinion in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., discussed by Norman Williams, Jr., during the fifties, and brought to
national attention in 1968 by the Douglas Commission Report, Building the American City.”).
225.
See, e.g., Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, followed eight years later by S.
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount
Laurel II].
226.
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1611, 1612 (2013) (“The Mount Laurel doctrine seems perennially hovering on the brink of
extinction. It was surrounded by controversy when it was finally made effective with a
‘builder’s remedy’ in 1983, and it barely survived its transition to statutory implementation
in the form of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act in 1985.”) (footnote omitted).
227.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 (“Fair Housing Act”), and -305 (establishing
Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”)) (West 2010).
228.
See In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 110 A.3d 31, 35 (N.J. 2015) [hereinafter Mount
Laurel IV] (“Our order effectively dissolves, until further order, the FHA’s exhaustion-ofadministrative-remedies requirement. Further, as directed, the order allows resort to the
courts, in the first instance, to resolve municipalities’ constitutional obligations under Mount
Laurel.”).
229.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713.
230.
Id. at 724.
231.
The Mount Laurel I court explained:
It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at what
level of government, must conform to the basic state constitutional
requirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.
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the case with leading exclusionary zoning rulings from other state high courts, 232
and in federal litigation as well.233
State judges have been much more active on the second front identified by
Judge Westenhaver, first shying away from, then partially and ultimately fully
embracing the idea that zoning and other land use restrictions based solely on
aesthetics are legitimate. State courts’ embrace of aesthetic zoning is an apt and
revealing example of what Chief Justice Shaw described as new situations being
“governed by the general principle, applicable to cases most nearly analogous, but
modified and adapted to new circumstances, by considerations of fitness and
propriety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those circumstances.” 234
Even a few years before comprehensive height, area, and use controls
debuted in New York City, judges and commentators cautioned against police power
regulation based solely on subjective ideas of beauty. New Jersey’s high court, in a
1905 decision invalidating a city ordinance regulating signs and billboards, cited
cases from Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Missouri, and Maryland in support
of the notion that “[a]esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power to take private property without compensation.” 235 One year later, the
Harvard Law Review published an article in which the author noted:
a series of cases in different states holding that a legislature has no
power to authorize a municipal corporation to prohibit the placing of
signs or advertisements upon private property, or fences enclosing
private property, or to limit the height and form of enclosures of
private property, from merely aesthetic motives.236

These are inherent in Art. I, par. 1 of our Constitution, the requirements of
which may be more demanding than those of the federal Constitution.
Id. at 725 (footnote and citations omitted).
232.
See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 215
A.2d 597, 613 (Pa. 1965) (“[T]he board of adjustment committed an error of law in upholding
the constitutionality of the Easttown Township four acre minimum requirement as applied to
appellees’ property.”); Bd. of Cty. Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396–97 (Va. 1959)
(affirming the lower court’s finding that a two-acre minimum was unconstitutional “insofar
as the two-acre restriction in the amendment is concerned, is unreasonable and arbitrary and
that it bears no relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the owners or
residents of the area so zoned.”).
233.
The United States Supreme Court has faced the evils of allegedly exclusionary
zoning in court challenges originating in, among other locations, metropolitan Rochester,
New York (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 495 (1975)), a Chicago suburb (Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977)), and Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio
(City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 191–92 (2003)). In
none of these cases, however, did the justices find that the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses had been violated.
234.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
235.
City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advert. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A.
267, 268 (N.J. 1905).
236.
Wilbur Larremore, Public Aesthetics, 20 HARV. L. REV. 35, 42 (1906).
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Before the first decade of the twentieth century drew to a close, in dictum
in Welch v. Swasey,237 the U.S. Supreme Court offered a minor consolation to
defenders of beauty. In a decision upholding height limitations imposed by the
Massachusetts legislature on certain buildings in Boston, Justice Peckham
conceded: “That in addition to these sufficient facts [regarding fire protection],
considerations of an esthetic nature also entered into the reasons for their passage,
would not invalidate them.”238 Nevertheless, those responsible for crafting New
York’s zoning scheme were aware that questions of beauty may be out-of-bounds.239
Newton Baker’s brief in response to the appellant Village of Euclid’s
defense of zoning doubled down on Judge Westenhaver’s concern that zoning, with
its concerns about beauty, was beyond the reach of the police power: “Even if the
world could agree by unanimous consent upon what is beautiful and desirable, it
could not, under our constitutional theory, enforce its decision by prohibiting a land
owner, who refuses to accept the world’s view of beauty, from making otherwise
safe and innocent uses of his land.”240 Justice Sutherland and his colleagues in the
majority did not take the bait, concluding Baker had not demonstrated that the
provisions of Euclid’s zoning ordinance were “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”241
By the time Baker was preparing his brief, judges in the earliest state court
challenges to zoning had already begun to offer hope to those who conceived of this
new device as a way to address urban and suburban eyesores. In 1925, for example,
the Court of Appeals of New York, in Wulfsohn v. Burden,242 refused to grant a
mandamus order sought by a property owner whose plans to construct an apartment
building in a residential district were frustrated by the City of Mount Vernon’s
zoning restrictions.243 The judges noted both that “courts have not been ready to say
that [zoning restrictions] might be sustained merely because they preserved the
aesthetic appearance of a private residential district and prevented it from being
blotched by the erection of some incongruous structure whereby the value of all
property was impaired,” and that the Welch Court had “gone so far as to approve in
substance the views . . . that aesthetic considerations might be considered as
auxiliary of what thus far have been regarded by the courts as more effective and

237.
238.
239.

214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909).
Id.
See, e.g., Lawson Purdy, Introduction in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY PLANNING 133 (1922). Purdy, the first vice-chairman of New
York City’s first zoning commission in 1913, explained, “[r]ather against my own
convictions, when I attempted to do some zoning work in New York, I eliminated the word
‘beautiful’ from my vocabulary.” Id.; see also S. J. MAKIELSKI, JR., THE POLITICS OF ZONING:
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 17 (1966).
240.
Brief and Argument for Appellee at 48, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (No. 665).
241.
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
242.
150 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1925).
243.
Id. at 125.
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sufficient reasons.”244 The Wulfsohn court rejected the landowner’s argument that,
“[b]ecause the provisions permitting the erection of apartment houses provide in
substance that there shall be no display of advertising visible from any street,” the
city’s zoning scheme was “based upon aesthetic considerations, and therefore, not
sustainable.”245
The inclusion of provisions in zoning ordinances that promoted aesthetics
and beauty was therefore not a fatal flaw. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
stated three years later, citing the ruling in Wulfsohn and other cases, even in states
“where the law is that aesthetic value alone cannot be made the basis for regulation,
it is held that where other elements are present and justify the regulation under the
police power, the aesthetic considerations may be taken into account in determining
whether the power shall be exercised.”246 Over the next few decades, this seed, a
hybrid of constitutional and common law, budded, flowered, and spread widely. 247
By the late 1930s, state high courts were open to the idea that the protection
of aesthetics was itself encompassed in the notion of general welfare. For example,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in a 1936 decision upholding
signage provisions in the zoning ordinance that
[t]he beauty of a residential neighborhood is for the comfort and
happiness of the residents and it tends to sustain the value of property
in the neighborhood. It is a matter of general welfare like other
conditions that add to the attractiveness of a community and the value
of residences there located.248

One of the cases cited by the Massachusetts court in support of this notion
was State ex rel. Carter v. Harper,249 an early Wisconsin zoning case in which the
owner of a pasteurizing plant sought to expand its nonconforming use in violation
of the city’s ordinance. In ruling against the property owner, this pre-Euclid tribunal
acknowledged that “[i]t is sometimes said that these [zoning] regulations rest solely
upon aesthetic considerations,” but explained that it was “not necessary for us to
consider how far aesthetic considerations furnish a justification for the exercise of
the police power.”250 This did not stop the court from waxing poetic about the
244.
Id. at 123.
245.
Id. at 124; see also Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99, 101 (Kan. 1923) (“With
the march of the times, however, the scope of the legitimate exercise of the police power is
not so narrowly restricted by judicial interpretation as it used to be. There is an aesthetic and
cultural side of municipal development which may be fostered within reasonable
limitations.”).
246.
Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 A. 142, 145 (N.H. 1928) (upholding setback
provisions in zoning ordinance).
247.
See, e.g., Neef v. City of Springfield, 43 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ill. 1942) (“It is no
objection, however, to a zoning ordinance that it tends to promote an aesthetic purpose, if its
reasonableness may be sustained on other grounds.”); In re Kerr, 144 A. 81, 83 (Pa. 1928)
(“While a zoning ordinance cannot be sustained merely on aesthetic ground, that may be
considered in connection with questions of general welfare.”).
248.
Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 3 N.E.2d 19, 22 (Mass. 1936).
249.
196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
250.
Id. at 455.
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evolving nature of beauty: “It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative
in their nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to new ideals. As
a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined, and that which formerly did not
offend cannot now be endured.”251 The Bay State’s highest court was not the only
bench impressed by these words. Two decades after Carter, like a snowbird, this
idea traveled from the frigid North to the Sunshine State.
In 1941, the Supreme Court of Florida, in turning down a challenge brought
by a landowner who asserted that commercial restrictions had outlived their
usefulness, cited its distant sibling jurisdiction:
In the Wisconsin case it is further pointed out that aesthetic
considerations have also been recognized and we think what is said
in the opinion is particularly relevant to the community of Miami
Beach because of its general character . . . . It is difficult to see how
the success of Miami Beach could continue if its aesthetic appeal
were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure
to the winter traveler.252

Looking back on the Miami Beach case four years later, the same court observed:
“[W]e took into consideration aesthetics in connection with general welfare of a
community having the characteristics and the appeal of Miami Beach.” 253
The intricate interplay between constitutional and common law regarding
aesthetic-based regulations continued when the U.S. Supreme Court announced its
ruling in Berman v. Parker,254 the 1954 decision upholding the constitutionality of
the use of eminent domain for Washington, D.C.’s urban renewal program. Justice
Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, reflected that “[p]ublic safety, public
health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order” constitute “some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal
affairs,”255 but not necessarily all. He continued with a statement that freed aesthetic
regulation from its mooring:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.256

It would not take long for at least one highly astute commentator to note the
implications for zoning. In his article published the following year, Zoning for
251.
Id.
252.
City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364, 367 (Fla. 1941).
253.
Stengel v. Crandon, 23 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1945); see also City of Miami
Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1949) (“[W]e believe, as we did when we
adopted the opinion in [Ocean & Inland] that the peculiar characteristics and qualities of the
City of Miami Beach justify zoning to perpetuate its aesthetic appeal, and that this is an
exercise of the police power in the protection of public welfare.”).
254.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
255.
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
256.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted).

814

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:771

Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,257 Professor Jesse Dukeminier, quoting “the
frank recognition of aesthetics”258 by Justice Douglas, provided a spot-on prediction:
“Although eminent domain was involved here, the implications of the language
seem very wide. The case may well provide the needed watershed in the field of
aesthetic zoning.”259
That watershed materialized quite rapidly. Fewer than four months after
Justice Douglas’s words hit the pages of the advance sheets, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin was the first of many state courts to perceive the language from Berman
as an invitation to authorize aesthetic-based land use regulations, in that instance an
ordinance mandating architectural review.260 The state supreme court observed,
“while the general rule is that the zoning power may not be exercised for purely
aesthetic considerations, such rule was undergoing development.”261 After Berman,
however, “this development of the law has proceeded to the point that renders it
extremely doubtful that such prior rule is any longer the law.” 262
Subsequent state court decisions over the next decade followed this pattern
of invoking Berman, in cases involving preservation of historic districts,263 denial of
a variance application to the owner of a large house hoping to lease to 15 tenants,264
minimum lot sizes,265 exclusion of a mobile home from a district for single
residences,266 an ordinance prohibiting clotheslines in a front or side yard,267 and the

257.
J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218 (1955).
258.
Id. at 237 n.70.
259.
Id.
260.
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222
(Wis. 1955).
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561–62 (Mass. 1955)
(“There is reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic considerations
than was given to them a half century ago.”).
264.
Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. 1958) (“The broad
scope of the concept of general welfare is illustrated by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in [Berman].”).
265.
Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (Pa. 1958)
(“[W]ith the passing of time, urban and suburban planning has become an accredited adjunct
of municipal government, aesthetic considerations have progressively become more and more
persuasive as sustaining reasons for the exercise of the police power.”).
266.
See Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 180 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Mass. 1962). Cf.
Wright v. Michaud, 200 A.2d 543, 550 (Me. 1964). The Court in Wright also quoted Berman
but qualified its ruling: “[A] municipality in determining whether there should be a
prohibition of individual mobilehomes throughout the municipality, may properly consider,
among other factors, the impact of the use of that type of structure upon the development of
the community.” Id. at 548.
267.
People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275–76 (N.Y. 1963) (“Once it be conceded
that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that
reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise of the
police power.”).
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unauthorized expansion of a nonconforming automobile wrecking yard. 268
This trend of acceptance continued over subsequent decades, as did the
Supreme Court’s occasional reiteration of its generous view of aesthetic controls. In
1978’s Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,269 Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion, shielding from a takings challenge New York City’s landmark
designation of Grand Central Terminal, made clear what was no longer
controversial:
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that States
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the
quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features of a city, appellants do not contest that New York City’s
objective of preserving structures and areas with special historic,
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible
governmental goal.270

Four years later, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a decision upholding a
local ordinance requiring junkyards and automobile graveyards to erect fences to
separate the property from residential neighbors, asserted that “[t]he former majority
rule that aesthetic considerations alone could not support an exercise of police power
is now the minority rule.”271 In support of its decision to join that majority (of cases
in which courts directly addressed the question), the court explained: “Aesthetic
regulation may provide corollary benefits to the general community such as
protection of property values, promotion of tourism, indirect protection of health
and safety, preservation of the character and integrity of the community, and
promotion of the comfort, happiness, and emotional stability of area residents.” 272
268.
Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 262 (Or. 1965) (quoting Stover, 191 N.E.
2d at 275) (“We join in the view ‘that aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an exercise
of the police power.’”).
269.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
270.
Id. at 129 (citation omitted) (citing, among other decisions, Berman and
Welch).
271.
State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 679 (N.C. 1982). According to the Court,
“[w]ith the 1981 Tennessee decision [State v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1981)], the new
majority includes seventeen jurisdictions where regulation based exclusively upon aesthetics
is permissible, while the minority rule is adhered to by eight jurisdictions, including our own.”
Id.
272.
Id. at 681; see also Kenneth Pearlman et al., Beyond the Eye of the Beholder
Once Again: A New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB. LAW. 1119, 1185 (2006)
(“[A]esthetics regulation in some form has become accepted by all state courts, even where
they do not permit aesthetic regulation alone.”); Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the
Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV.
125, 166 (1980) (counting decisions specifically addressing the question, while noting that
“the validity of regulation based solely on aesthetic considerations is still an open question in
twenty-six states”). On cases specifically addressing aesthetic zoning (not police power
regulation generally), see Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can’t Build That Here: The
Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013,
1014–15 (1990) (“After Berman, several views developed concerning the propriety of zoning
based on aesthetics alone. Currently, twelve states do not permit zoning based solely on
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Judicial recognition of aesthetics as a legitimate goal of the police power
did not guarantee a victory for the land use regulator. 273 Nevertheless, it is
undeniable that, to paraphrase Chief Justice Shaw, over the course of several
decades courts articulated the general principle that aesthetics-based regulation was
not necessarily illegal, and this principle, in the hands of other judges from around
the nation, was subsequently and consistently applied to nearly analogous cases and
modified and adapted to a range of new circumstances, “by considerations of fitness
and propriety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those circumstances.” 274 The
product was yet another important feature of the common law of zoning.

CONCLUSION
After 100 years, much can be, and has been, said and written about the
American brand of comprehensive height, area, and use zoning. For concluding
purposes the two most important things to say are: (1) in the words of Professor
Sonia A. Hirt, “[t]raditional zoning . . . has been under fire since the 1950s;”275 and
(2) to quote Professor William Fischel, “reports of [zoning’s] demise have been
greatly exaggerated.”276 With an understanding of the nature and import of the
common law of zoning, we now have one more reason why, despite the constant
carping of critics, zoning endures, and even thrives, on the ground—where it counts.
Professor Hirt, a highly regarded comparative planning expert, has done an
admirable job of highlighting the “broad streams of critique [of traditional zoning
that] have emerged: libertarian,277 economic, social, environmental, and
aesthetic.”278 Zoning, according to the naysayers, “works against the free market,”
and “segregates people by class and by race . . . act[ing] as a gatekeeper that favors
insiders (those who already have property in a given place) over outsiders (those
who wish to acquire property in this place but cannot)”; it “brings about excessive
land consumption . . . [and] contribut[es] to pollution,” and “encourage[s] cookiecutter environments . . . reduc[ing] the complexity of urbanism.”279 Moreover,
despite state and local legislative fixes to statutes and legislation, authorizing

aesthetics while eleven states allow zoning based on aesthetic factors alone.”) (citation
omitted).
273.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. 1980) (The Court,
while stating that “that a zoning ordinance may accommodate aesthetic concerns,” found a
town’s restrictive sign ordinance violated free speech protections under the First
Amendment).
274.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
275.
SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION 44 (2014).
276.
FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 68.
277.
The best of these critiques was and remains Ellickson’s Alternatives to Zoning,
supra note 91, at 781 in which the author memorably concluded, “[z]oning is today out of
control and must be severely curtailed, if not entirely replaced.”
278.
HIRT, supra note 275, at 44.
279.
Id. at 44–46.
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innovations such as incentive zoning,280 noncumulative zoning,281 development
agreements,282 planned-unit developments,283 and form-based zoning,284 the
traditional segregation of uses, with single-family detached dwellings at the top of
the hierarchy, remains the predominant model. 285
To Professor Fischel, the esteemed economist of land regulation, the main
movers behind zoning in the early twentieth century were not “progressives who
supported scientific management of government, or lawyers who argued for an
expansive view of the police power.”286 Instead, to Fischel, the roles played by these
actors were “supply response[s] to a popular demand for zoning,” a demand that
“was filtered through housing developers, who . . . found that they could sell homes
for more profit if the community had zoning.” 287 Under either theory (or a
combination of the two), it is undeniable that American zoning spread quickly and
widely during its first few decades.288
The fascinating question remains: why, after so many demographic,
ideological, economic, and technological changes, has zoning not only hung on but
continued to thrive after a century of unprecedented change? The simplest
explanation might be legislative inertia attributable to the absence of obviously
better alternatives, to the difficulty of tearing up zoning and starting over from
scratch, to the fear of unintended consequences caused by change, or to partisan
animosity resulting in legislative gridlock. Never satisfied with an ostensibly
280.
See, e.g., JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW
YORK EXPERIENCE 1 (2000) (expertly summarizing the good and bad of this post-Euclidean
tool); Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 161, at 305–06 (describing incentive zoning as
arrangements “in which landowners obtain permission to exceed zoning limits in exchange
for providing various public goods (such as low-income housing or public space)”).
281.
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249,
252 (2010) (“After World War II, municipalities began experimenting with noncumulative
zones that excluded residential uses from industrial zones.”).
282.
See, e.g., David L. Callies & Malcolm Grant, Paying for Growth and Planning
Gain: An Anglo-American Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact Fees and
Development Agreements, 23 URB. LAW. 221, 239 (1991) (explaining that many potential
takings issues “are relatively easily resolved if landowner-developer and local government
can come to agreeable terms over what the developer will contribute in exchange for
guarantees from the local authority, such as certainty with respect to planning permissions,
and memorialize these terms in a statutory development agreement.”).
283.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Legislation for Planned Unit Developments
and Master-Planned Communities, 40 URB. LAW. 419, 420 (2008) (“Simply put, it is an
integrated land development project that local governments review and approve
comprehensively at one time, usually under the zoning ordinance.”).
284.
See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Rezoning the Post-Industrial City: Hartford, 31
PROB. & PROP. 44, 46 (2017) (“Form-based codes are a form of land development regulation
that focuses on physical form, rather than the separation of uses, as its organizing principle.”).
285.
Id. at 46–59; see also FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 67 (“[N]on-Euclidean
innovations have not significantly displaced municipal zoning.”).
286.
FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 170.
287.
Id. at 171.
288.
See supra notes 85 and 91; see also FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 171.
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obvious explanation, in 1996, the then-venerable Professor Haar offered a
provocative ideological explanation:
The popularity of zoning lies in its melting pot quality: while it
embodies the strand of local democracy and political and legal, if not
economic, equality, its most powerful attachment is to a free market
operated on by individual liberties. But, at the same time, the public
interest of a larger society asserts itself.289

Professor Fischel has offered an equally intriguing explanation, noting that the
inflation in housing values in the second half of the twentieth century “is key to
galvanizing the demand for regulation” such as exclusionary zoning devices and
growth management schemes.290
There is more than a grain of truth to each of these explanations, but one
significant factor has been overlooked by the many critics who focus on the overt
structures of zoning, that is, the state statutes and local ordinances that, despite some
modifications on the margins,291 look so much like each other and like their original
precursors. Flying under the radar has been the development of the common law of
zoning, as hundreds of judges in dozens of jurisdictions, deciding thousands of
reported cases, have through individual lawsuits subtly but significantly reshaped
the corpus of zoning law.292
This extensive and expansive trial-and-error process has yielded several
positive externalities, as judges have confronted and resolved unanticipated
problems and issues, rendering unnecessary amendments to statutes and ordinances.
For example, by identifying and developing rules to address spot zoning, courts have
sent the message to local officials that they need to regulate responsibly and
consistently. Similarly, some courts have employed the distinction between
legislative and quasi-judicial functions of local elected bodies as a partial fix for
local officials who succumb to developer pressures.

289.
Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm Shift?, 30
U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1020 (1996); see also HIRT, supra note 275, at 12 (“U.S. zoning is at
its base a cultural institution: it was built to reflect the values of its founders, values that have
been and, arguably, continue to be in alliance with popular American ideals of good
government and good urbanism.”).
290.
FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 215. Professor Fischel also noted that “homevoters
became much more caring about their major asset beginning in the early 1970s. This shift in
attention to home values meant that any potential threat to those values . . . would draw
homeowners’ attention.” Id. at 214.
291.
See, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Introduction to the
Symposium: Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L.
REV. 305, 310 (2013) (noting that post-Euclidean techniques such as planned unit
developments and overlay districts “are effectively add-ons—regulatory tweaks that operate
within zoning’s existing framework. Zoning’s fundamental structure remains largely
unchanged.”).
292.
Professor Davidson has suggested to the Author that in developing a common
law of zoning, judges may have improved the efficiency of this system of land use regulation.
I would encourage others more Coasean-inclined to pursue this intriguing question.
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It is unlikely that the drafters of the SZEA and its progeny in state codes
anticipated that landowners would game the zoning system by claiming hardships
that the owners themselves created, but once that strategy became apparent, judges
used their equity powers in an attempt to check the abuse. Sometimes the abuse
might be on the public side, as when local land use regulators used their power to
punish certain owners or types of ownership. This time, state courts from around the
nation employed a maxim that articulated a fundamental principle of zoning law in
an attempt to keep the playing field level. At other times, the challenge was
modernizing zoning jurisprudence to keep up with changing needs and to
accommodate new variations on traditional police power regulations, as was the case
when state courts, abetted by developments in the U.S. Supreme Court, recognized
the validity of aesthetic-based controls.
Not all aspects of the common law of zoning have been positive
contributions to the body of land use law. Indeed, there are regrettable aspects of
several of the examples discussed in Part IV. For all the ink spilled by courts in
determining whether specific rezonings constitute illegal spot zoning, there is still a
great deal of ambiguity regarding, and dissatisfaction with, the term. 293 The quasijudicial approach taken by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Fasano, too, has earned
its share of valid criticism, especially (as noted in Section IV.B) by other courts.294
Some courts and commentators have expressed discomfort with using the selfimposed hardship rule in the context of height and area (as opposed to use
variances), showing sympathy with property owners who purchase or inherit parcels
from landowners who would have stood a good chance of meeting the relevant test
for securing relief.295 The distinction between use and ownership can easily be
blurred in cases involving short-term rentals, particularly under the sharing
economy, so it is fair to ask: does it make sense to treat apartments and rooms
“rented” under Airbnb as hotel uses, or should the court instead focus on the fact

293.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Spot Zoning: New Ideas for an Old Problem,
48 URB. LAW. 737, 738 (2016) (“Spot zoning law is an archaic and elusive concept made up
of standing law principles, procedural presumptions, and ambiguous doctrine that make
analysis difficult.”). Nor is it necessarily a positive development that jurisdictions that have
little in common—demographically, geographically, financially, politically, and otherwise—
share the same basic statutory, administrative, and judicial land use regulatory system, as
David Schleicher reminded the Author in a very helpful and provocative comment.
294.
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City,
101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 102 (2015) (“[E]ven in states where the planning mandate has detailed
scope and significant legal force, the power of the plan to trump zoning is substantially limited
by the identity of the plan’s beneficiaries,” and that “court intervention will vary significantly
based on unwritten assumptions about who the plan is supposed to protect from whom . . . .
”).
295.
See, e.g., Richard Roeser Prof’l Builder v. Anne Arundel Cty., 793 A.2d 545,
561 (Md. 2002) (“[I]f the prior owner has not self-created a hardship, a self-created hardship
is not immaculately conceived merely because the new owner obtains title.”); see also
MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 98, § 6.47 (“To hold that mere purchase with knowledge of
existing zoning is always a self-created hardship improperly makes the purchase of land a
basis for denying a variance.”).
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that ownership has technically never changed hands?296 Finally, aesthetic-based land
use regulation may be taken too far, as critics of certain form-based codes have
convincingly argued.297
Over the last half-century, much of zoning and land use scholarship has
focused on constitutional lawmaking by the courts, particularly on the “brooding
omnipresence of regulatory takings.”298 Most of the leading regulatory takings cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court have involved the justices weighing the rights of private
property owners versus the public interest299 in disputes over the constitutionality of
local and state land use regulations designed to protect our fragile environment. 300
In hundreds of disputes in federal and state tribunals, property owners have waged
a sustained assault on local environmental law, some of it under the zoning
umbrella.301
296.
See, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But For Local
Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
901, 921 (2015) (“[A]reas once zoned as residential can become de facto commercial ‘hotel’
districts. Because of this, neighbors to Airbnb renters have often lodged complaints under
zoning, landlord-tenant, or contract law.”).
297.
See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L.
REV. 571, 580 (2013) (expressing “concerns about using the law to impose aesthetic
preferences on the built landscape”).
298.
Michael Allan Wolf, The Brooding Omnipresence of Regulatory Takings:
Urban Origins and Effects, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1835, 1835 (2013).
299.
For a fascinating empirical analysis of judicial attempts to strike this delicate
balance, see James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 40 (2016) (“Supreme Court takings doctrine can be understood as
the means to maintain and reinforce, in a very particular fashion, the tension between two
conflicting commitments that have figured prominently throughout the Nation’s history—
strong property rights on the one hand, and the imperatives of an activist government on the
other.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 87, 144 (2017) (“[L]egal mechanisms for policing the boundary between private
property rights and permissible government regulation . . . largely leave public officials and
judges to their own devices.”).
300.
See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)
(wetlands); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(watershed protection); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (wetlands); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (protected species);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (floodplains and bike paths); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (beachfront management legislation); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Com, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (coastal zone controls); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (flood-protection area); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (damage caused by coal mine
subsidence); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (open
space); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (open space).
301.
See, e.g., John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 365 (2002) (providing a compendium of
such laws); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law:
Integrationist and MultiModal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 837–38 (2011)
(including a list of two dozen tools that local governments can use to “adapt[] land use
practices and patterns to protect waters,” several of which involve zoning).
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The cases in which courts have framed, adapted, and reshaped the common
law of zoning—several of which have involved the validity of these same aspects of
local environmental law302—are an essential part of our uniquely American form of
land use regulation.303 It is a litigation landscape that has earned the serious attention
of all parties concerned with making land use regulation more efficient, modern,
fair, and sustainable.

302.
See, e.g., Richard Roeser Prof’l Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty., 793 A.2d
at 545, 547 (Md. 2002) (concerning variance application by contract purchaser who sought
to build on part of a lot “located in the Critical Area ‘buffer’ zone adjacent to wetlands.”);
Malerba v. Warren, 438 N.Y.S.2d 936, 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (derogation case in which
the town sought “to enjoin defendants from maintaining a concrete block foundation and
dwelling . . . which was erected and so placed without a permit and which structures, it is
alleged, are prohibited by the zoning and tidal flood hazard ordinances of the Town of East
Hampton”); In re Schieber, 927 A.2d 737, 740–41 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (rejecting
Appellants’ argument “that the Borough’s enactment of Ordinance No. 945 constitutes illegal
spot zoning by targeting Appellants’ Property and including it in the Borough’s flood plain
despite scientific data that conclusively demonstrates that the 1996 FEMA map is less
accurate” than the private study Appellants had performed).
303.
See HIRT, supra note 275, at 15 (referring to “[t]he peculiarities of the current
U.S. zoning system, with its focus on strict order, land-use segregation, and exclusive private
spaces limited to particular family types and particular physical configurations”).

